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The formulation and execution of an acquisition strategy
is a vital facet of the Government's process of acquiring goods
and services. In this analysis, the researcher evaluates the
strategy used by the Naval Supply Center Oakland to acquire
the Naval Integrated Storage and Retrieval System (NISTARS)
,
an automated inventory control .warehousing system. The tech-
nical scope, project cost and system procurement technique
used for the NISTARS project renders this acquisition very
unique for a field activity such as NSC Oakland. This study
contrasts selected traditional aspects of an acquisition
strategy with those used by NSC Oakland to acquire NISTARS.
Additionally, the lessons that NSC Oakland learned from their
analysis of past automated inventory control acquisitions by
other Department of Defense activities are presented.
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The concept of an acquisition strategy is important to
the process of acquiring goods and services by the Federal
Government. In buying "off-the-shelf" items from vendors or
suppliers, the strategy is rather simple and straightforward
and consists generally of insuring that competition is obtained
and that the item meets the specific needs of the purchasing
organization. The acquisition strategy for a major system,
however, can become rather involved and complex, can be pro-
jected over a period of several years, and can require par-
ticipation by several major organizations and functional
disciplines
.
This thesis has been undertaken in order to evaluate the
acquisition strategy developed and executed for the Naval
Integrated Storage Tracking and Retrieval System (NISTARS)
.
NISTARS, as will be discussed in detail later, is a mechanized
material handling system which ultimately will provide service
to various major Naval Supply Centers and geographically con-
tiguous Naval installations. For example, the industrial
Naval Air Station (NAS) Alameda and the Naval Supply Center
(NSC) Oakland are two activities which are located in close
geographical proximity. The two facilities exhibit the
following common characteristics: [12:7]

1) Both perform large wholesale supply functions .
2) They each stock. 25,000 items common to both stock
points
.
3) Both are presently operating in warehouses of
essentially World War II design,
4) Both can make significant improvements in
productivity through mechanization.
5) The machinery used is obsolescent as neither activity
has had a substantial capital improvement in the
last 15 years.
Given the geographical proximity and functional redundancy
between NSC Oakland and NAS Alameda, it is reasonable to
question the feasibility and desirability of administratively
combining these two activities. A multitude of studies has
been conducted regarding this issue. Two current and signif-
icant studies include the Department of Defense Material
Distribution Study (DODMDS) and the Shore Establishment Re-
alignment Study (SER) . Two major DODMDS findings and recom-
mendations were: [12:8]
1) Further investment in improved systems probably
could save money across the distribution system.
2) The management and administration of the Navy
distribution facilities in the Oakland area (i.e.,
NAS Alameda and NSC Oakland) should be merged.
This latter recommendation was a factor in the Navy's decision
to study the issue of wholesale supply consolidation [17:14].
In April of 1978, the Chief of Naval Operations directed
that consolidation be studied as a part of the Shore Estab-
lishment Realignment (SER V) study [12:9]. The resulting SER
report indicated that "consolidation was feasible and cost
8

effective given proper investment funding" [32]. If con-
solidation did in fact occur, then the NSC would experience
a significant increase in material storage and movement prob-
lems. As was previously cited, the NSC had not experienced
a recent significant material improvement; however, the pro-
posed activity merger provided an environmental impetus from
which to justify and acquire state-of-the-art modernization.
B. THE SYSTEM
The Naval Integrated Storage Tracking and Retrieval System
(NISTARS) is a mechanized material handling system. This
state-of-the-art multi-million dollar project contains pro-
visions for an installation at NSC Norfolk and NSC San Diego,
in addition to NSC Oakland. "NISTARS will control all ware-
house functions including receiving, storing, issuing,
consolidation of parcel post shipping and other inventory
management procedures" [18:2]. The specific material handling
equipment will vary in response to the unique requirements of
each site; however, a significant degree of standardization
will exist at each installation. The NSC Oakland NISTARS
will serve as a prototype even though the automatic warehous-
ing concept does have the following predecessors:
1) The Automated Storage Kitting and Retrieval System
(ASKARS) was procured by the Naval Regional Procure-
ment Off ice, Long Beach for four Naval Air Rework
Facility (NARF) sites, one of which is NARF Alameda.
2) The Depot Integrated Storage and Retrieval System
(DISTARS) was procured for the Defense General
Supply Center, Richmond, Virginia, by the Defense
Construction Supply Center.

3) The Warehouse Information Control System (WICS)
was procured by the Air Force for the Warner Robins
Air Force Base.
The previously cited systems are appropriately classified as
being forerunners to NISTARS because they are similar in
function, but less sophisticated in applied technology and
scope than NISTARS.
Presently (Spring 1980) NSC Oakland is attempting to
acquire the NISTARS automated material handling system. In-
terviewees have indicated that this acquisition is unique for
the Oakland field purchasing activity for the following reasons
1) The project contracting officer (PCO) affirmed that
the projected total project dollar threshold
($40+ million) greatly exceeds that of a normally
encountered transaction (e.g., the previous highest
dollar single procurement action was $7 million)
.
2) NSC Oakland is buying the system for two other supply
activities, each of which has their own purchase
departments
.
3) The acquisition is under the centralized management
of the Naval Supply System Command Headquarters
(NSSC).
4) Project officers were appointed by and work directly
for the NSSC.
C. PURPOSE
The purpose of this case study is as follows:
1) Analyze the NISTARS project from an acquisition
and contract management point of view.
2) Infer acquisition lessons learned to be applied
in future similar acquisitions.
3) The insights obtained will be added to the existing




The research question for the case study is: "What
significant lessons can be learned from an analysis of a
major acquisition by a field purchasing activity?" The
following ancillary issues will be addressed:
1) What is an acquisition strategy and how is it
formulated and executed?
2) What was the acquisition strategy for the NISTARS
project?
3) What problems were associated with the implementation
of the NISTARS acquisition strategy and how were
they overcome?
4) What lessons were learned from the NISTARS acquisition?
E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This analysis and subsequent observation iteration will
be conducted in a spirit of sensitivity to the fact that the
NISTARS acquisition is still in the pre-award stage. Accord-
ingly, an overt effort will be made not to prejudice the
acquisition. The terms and conditions of the NISTARS solici-
tation stipulate that the contractor will have over two years
after award to complete performance, ergo the scope of this
study will not address all aspects of contracting officer and
contractor effort.
F. METHODOLOGY
Primary research material was collected by interviewing key
project persons in addition to an evaluation of the documented
project plans and strategy. The project persons interviewed
11

represented the following functional areas: project office,
purchasing, engineering, operations research, comptroller and
automatic data processing.
Secondary research material was obtained via a compre-
hensive search of the literature base for applicable studies
and relevant reference material. Specifically, information
was obtained from the library of the Naval Postgraduate School
(NPS) in addition to material from the personal libraries of
NPS professors D. V. Lamm and A. W. McMasters.
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This thesis is organized in the following format. Chapter
I discusses the NSC Oakland and NAS Alameda warehouse environ-
ment and the general nature of the automated warehousing
NISTARS project. Chapter II discusses significant traditional
acquisition strategy concepts and issues such as competition,
relevant factors in selecting an appropriate form of contract-
ual instrument, multi-year funding, project management, and
life cycle cost analysis. Chapter III is a background chapter
in which the traditional acquisition strategy precepts delin-
eated in Chapter II are contrasted with the explicit realities
of the NISTARS acquisition. Issues such as the following will
be addressed:
1) What lessons were learned from past automatic
warehousing acquisitions?
2) The NISTARS project manager was not in residence




3) How did NSC Oakland attempt to obtain competition?
4) Why were performance specifications utilized?
5) Would a life cycle cost analysis have been appli-
cable for the NISTARS acquisition and how could it
have been executed?
Finally, Chapter IV contains the lessons learned, conclusions
and recommendations from the case study analysis.
H. CONSTRAINT
Originally, when this case study analysis was undertaken,
a contract for NISTARS was programmed to be awarded in April
1980. If the project had remained on schedule, then this
researcher would have had the opportunity to contrast the
Government's anticipated or desired acquisition strategy
result with that which was actually attained. Presently, the
NISTARS contract is projected to be awarded at the end of
calendar year 1980; accordingly, the window from which this
researcher can infer and articulate lessons learned has been
abbreviated.
I. ASSUMPTION
It is assumed that the reader has a general knowledge of





What is an acquisition strategy? What factors are con-
tained in an acquisition strategy? These simply expressed
questions are not simply answered. The ambiguity associated
with the acquisition strategy issue is evidenced by the re-
search results presented in a thesis titled, "Acquisition
Strategy: Concept and Definition" [4:11]. The authors con-
cluded that what information could be found regarding acqui-
sition strategy (by literature search and interview) pointed
to it being a narrow, poorly defined concept. One could
acquire a sensitivity for the significance of and parameters
addressed by an acquisition strategy by a reading of the
Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-109 [25]. The
Circular delineates factors such as the following which could
be encompassed by an acquisition strategy: methods for obtain-
ing and sustaining competition, methods for analyzing and
evaluating contractor risk, decisions on whom to solicit,
guidelines for the evaluation, acceptance or rejection of
proposals, selection of the type of contract best suited for
the particular acquisition, need and desirability for con-
tractor incentives, contract administration, and the relevance
and application of life cycle or design to cost considerations
In an Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) printed
14

discussion of OMB Circular A-109 dated August 1976, the points
are made that "the strategy" should form the basis for the
manager's acquisition plan [25:11]. Given that a plan is in
fact formulated, then the project manager has a medium from
which to communicate with higher authority, his project team
and the contractor. Additionally, the plan provides a means
to measure accomplishment and evaluate contingencies. Finally,
the OFPP pamphlet categorizes a plan as being potentially dy-
namic; that is to say that the strategy should be continually
reviewed, refined and updated as appropriate.
In an effort to establish a framework with which selected
NISTARS project parameters can be contrasted, a detailed dis-
cussion of the relevant previously cited acquisition strategy
factors follows.
What is competition? One definition is "an environment
of varying dimensions relating to buy-sell relationships in
which the buyer induces, stimulates or relies on conditions
in the marketplace that cause independent sellers to contend
confidently for the award of a contract" [1:1A-B3]. The
concept of competition is of paramount importance as it is
firmly entrenched in procurement law and policy. Public law
dictates that the Government is required (emphasis added) to
acquire goods, services and facilities of the requisite qual-
ity within the time needed at the lowest reasonable price
utilizing competitive procurement methods to the maximum
extent possible [28] . There are a number of reasons in
15

addition to legal mandate as to why competition is such a
dominant factor in acquisition. One is the principle that
all qualified sellers should have the opportunity to vie for
Government business on an equal basis with fellow competitors.
In other words, a contractor should receive an award because
his contract was perceived as being most advantageous to the
Government, not because he received a most favored status.
Government acquisition is performed in a fish bowl; accord-
ingly, all actions must be conducted in an atmosphere of
fairness so as to be able to withstand intense public scrutiny.
The use of competition in the impartial environment of the
marketplace is a way to eliminate bias or the appearance of
a rigged award. The Supreme Court has reinforced the precept
of promoting fairness with its finding that: [34]
It is better that an individual should occasionally suffer
from the mistakes of public officers or agents than to
adopt a rule which, through improper combinations or
collusion, might be turned to the detriment and injury
of the public.
Other reasons that competition is desirable are that it
may stimulate technical innovation, reduce risks or costs and
induce effective management. Competition is one of the most
important considerations in the formulation of an acquisition
strategy. If competition is effectively planned and properly
executed, then the project manager may be able to eliminate
or control problems in the critical areas of contract per-
formance, schedule and cost.
In an effort to fairly present the competition argument,
the following potential negative effects are cited.
16

J. Ronald Fox in his book, Arming America
,
presented four
factors which could render competitive procurement as being
less desirable than single source procurement [13:257].
First, competition requires more time and effort than a single
source procurement. Efforts such as writing statements of
work and requests for proposals, evaluation, and "best" con-
tractor selection can be rigorous, time-consuming evolutions.
Second, Fox states that, "Competition increases the likelihood
of protests and disputes." Third, Fox states that, "Competi-
tion frequently disrupts long established relationships be-
tween Government and industry personnel who have previously
worked together on the procurement of a particular item."
Fourth, Fox indicates that, with competition, "The Government
buying organization must evaluate the producer's quality and
capability of competing contractors." The selection of a new,
lower cost source could result in quality problems which could
impair or preclude performance and which would have to be
justified to the upper echelons [13:257].
Given that competition is a generally desired, frequently
required acquisition parameter, then how is it attained? A
wide solicitation from a multitude of potentially qualified
sources may spark contractor interest and, hence, competition.
Additionally, for advertized acquisitions, [15 ;1]
Competition can be increased and made a more useful
device by using functional purchase (performance ori-
ented) descriptions to elicit total product competition
rather than the narrow initial price competition asso-
ciated with the use of formal Government specifications.
17

A performance specification delineates the Government's
requirement in terms such, as function, capacity or operation.
The explicit structure of the product is primarily left as an
option for the contractor. The quoted allegations that the
use of performance specification could increase competition
was made by Robert Judson, then Executive Director of the
Navy Center for Acquisition Research, in a paper that he drafted
on the subject [Ref. IS]. Mr. Judson cited a 1967 Comptroller
General decision to give credibility to his affirmation. The
essence of the decision was that "performance oriented speci-
fications" in addition to protecting the Government's interest
ensure that all manufacturers have an opportunity to compete
for Government purchases [8] . The use of performance specifi-
cations to increase competition is an issue that has surfaced
in other acquisition legislation. The proposed 1979 Federal
Acquisition Reform Act, commonly referred to as the "Chiles
Bill" stipulated that, "To the maximum extent practicable and
consistent with the needs of the agency, functional specifica-
tions shall be used to permit a variety of distinct products
or services to qualify and to encourage effective competition"
[30 :14].
Given that competition has in fact been promoted and
obtained, then how are the offerors evaluated to select the
eventual supplier?
In competitive negotiations, the delineation of a compet-
itive range is used to narrow the field of offerors.
18

A contracting officer is required to hold discussions with
all offerors in the competitive range in the following
circumstances: [31:104]
In all negotiated procurements in excess of $10,000,
in which rates or prices are not fixed by law or regu-
lation and in which time of delivery will permit,
proposals, including price, shall be solicited from
the maximum number of qualified sources consistent with
the nature and requirements of the supplies or services
to be procured, and written or oral discussions shall
be conducted with all responsible offerors who submit
proposals within a competitive range, price and other
factors considered.
The contracting officer must make value judgments as "compet-
itive range constraints" and "maximum number of participants"
concepts are not explicitly defined. Any offeror who has
been determined to be outside the competitive range is excluded
from further consideration in the acquisition. This exclusion
can occur any time prior to the completion of negotiations
with the successful offerors. Conversely, having a multitude
of potential offerors within the competitive range can cause
the contracting officer a coordination concern as all these
aspiring offerors must be included in discussions and nego-
tiations leading to source selection. The opportunity for a
number of simultaneous multi-of feror negotiation sessions
exists
.
What are the contracting officer's primary considerations
in establishing a competitive range? In proposal evaluation,
Consideration is given to cost or price issues, technical
capability and capacity, in addition to any relevant cri-
teria which may be particularly important in determining
whether or not the offeror has a reasonable opportunity
for being selected for the final award. [31:105].
19

The contracting officer's paramount concern is to select a
proposal which, affords the Government the greatest advantage
in terms of price and other factors. One factor that can
significantly affect the number of offerors, hence the degree
of competition, is the perceived risk associated with an
acquisition. The magnitude and potential impact of inferred
risk are functions of the entity evaluating the acquisition.
Technical competence, experience, capacity, commitment to
other actions, organizational essence, and financial posture
are some of the considerations which are unique to an organi-
zation. If potential offerors are to be enticed into the
acquisition arena, then the Government needs a medium to share
and minimize vulnerability to risk and to promote fair and
reasonable treatment. Selection of the appropriate type of
contractual instrument can facilitate the previously cited
goals. An analysis of the types, parameters and applicability
of a variety of contractual forms follows.
B. CONTRACTS
Contracts are usually classified as a function of the
type of pricing provisions they contain and generally fall
into one of the following two basic categories: cost reim-
bursement contracts and fixed-price contracts. These two
basic types of contracts differ in the risks assumed by the
parties for performance costs and the type and amount of in-
centives offered to the contractor. Within the firm- fixed-
price and cost reimbursement general categories, there are
20

a number of specific contract adaptations to make the instru-
ment amenable for the given acquisition situation. Two basic
considerations in selecting a contract type are to obtain an
equitable agreement for both contractual parties while simul-
taneously promoting the best interests of the Government.
What are some of the pertinent constraints that must be
considered in selecting the proper type of contract for a
particular acquisition? Several factors will be presented
that could be considered so as to convey a flavor for the
process. Proper allocation of and subsequent fair and rea-
sonable compensation for risk are paramount considerations
in an acquisition. The following potential risk factors
could be scrutinized: [3:121]
1) The complexity of the goods or services solicited,
2) The perceived duration of the contract and any
associated production runs.
3) Past experience and reputation of the contractor.
4) The technical capacity and financial responsibility
of the contractor.
5) The accuracy with which the performance costs can
be estimated.
6) The potential for and possible magnitude of sub-
contracting.
Additional factors that could be analyzed include: [3:121]
1) The degree of competition.
2) The urgency of the need.
3) Associated administrative costs.
4) Business practices in the specific industry.
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Given that some of the basic considerations have been artic-
ulated, it is now appropriate to dissect some specific con-
tractual instruments. The Firm- Fixed-Price (FFP) contract
is the Government preferred type of contract. In fact, when
the acquisition is accomplished via the formally advertized
method of procurement, the Government is required to use a
Firm-Fixed-Price contract. It is an agreement by which the
contractor consents to provide specific goods or services for
an explicit price. The FFP contract could be used given the
following circumstances: the requirement is for standard
commercial items or military items where the specifications
are fairly fixed; price competition exists; the contractor
has production experience; and costs can be estimated with
reasonable confidence [3:122]. If a fair and reasonable
price can be established by either competition or price anal-
ysis, then the FFP contract should always be used. Use of
the FFP contract affords a significant reduction in contract
administration during performance; accordingly, Government
administrative personnel can be utilized in other areas. The
point is made that administrative responsibilities are dimin-
ished for the Government because under a FFP contract the
seller has the maximum incentive to produce efficiently since
he is bearing all the financial risk.
The Fixed Price Incentive (FPI) form of contract is a
flexible instrument that can be designed so as to share the
burden of risk and to reward exceptional commercial performance
22

The parameters and process for using the FPI contract are as
follows; The contractural parties negotiate a target cost, a
target profit, a ceiling price and a formula termed a "share
ratio." When the goods or services solicited by the buyer
have been obtained, then the final costs are negotiated and
the final contract price is determined via the share ratio.
If the final costs are less than the target cost, then the
contractor can share in the cost savings and receive a profit
in excess of the target profit. The inherent assumption of
the FPI instrument is that having the ability to enhance
profit could or does induce the contractor to reduce costs,
produce a better product and expedite production. It is im-
portant to note that the share ratio works two ways. That is
to say, if the final contract cost exceeds the target cost,
then via the share ratio, the contractor's profit is reduced
below the target profit. If the final contract cost exceeds
the ceiling price, then the contractor could find himself in
the position of having worked for a net loss. The share ratio
percentage values are flexible at the time of negotiation as
the parties may negotiate one formula for below target cost
and a different formula for above target cost. The essence
of the FPI contract is that the contractor by his management
skills (_or lack thereof) has an opportunity to directly
influence his profit.
The advent of high technology initially contributed and
continues to reinforce the use of cost reimbursement contracts.
23

This is because the Government desires to field the best
possible weapon systems; accordingly, state-of-the-art complex
acquisitions result. High technology is associated with high
risk; accordingly, a contractor is reluctant or perhaps
strongly opposed to accepting a fixed-price contract. Some
salient features of cost-type contracts are the following:
[16:120]
1) The buyer assumes nearly all the financial risk.
2) It is generally correct to state that a seller does
not have to achieve performance to be reimbursed.
3) The Government does retain the caveat that only
allowable costs--to a predetermined figure--will
be paid.
A primary disadvantage to the buyer with this general type of
instrument is that the seller has little effective incentive
to control costs. Another buyer disadvantage associated with
the cost type contract concerns the fact that these instru-
ments are particularly expensive to administer. Costs that
are allowable must be agreed upon in advance and then they
must be audited to affirm validity. A related problem to
this issue is the fact that for the Government to have the
capability to effectively audit the contractual costs, the
seller must have an accounting system that separates and
assigns costs to a specific cost contract. Since the buyer
and seller may not always agree as to the allowability of




At this point, development of a relevant (for the NISTARS
acquisition) form of cost contract is appropriate. The Cost-
Plus- Incentive-Fee (CPIF) type of contract is an adaptation
of the FPI instrument. Before the parameters of the CPIF
are delineated, two basic differences from the FPI contract
will be highlighted. First, the CPIF contract does not have
a ceiling price. Second, the maximum fee that a contractor
can receive is subject to Defense Acquisition Regulations
(DAR) limitations. The CPIF instrument attempts to provide
a mechanism to reward the efficient performer. The features
of the CPIF contract are as follows: A target cost is nego-
tiated (this task is of utmost importance as the potential
success of the incentive provision is a direct function of
the target cost validity) . Since risk and uncertainty are
prevalent factors, it is particularly difficult to estimate
a target cost that has an equal probability of either an over-
run or an underrun. Given that the parties negotiate an
acceptable target cost, then the next features to develop are
the maximum and minimum fees and the share ratios. The maxi-
mum fee may be constrained by a legal ceiling. Minimum fee
could range from zero to a guaranteed minimum. If the minimum
fee is in fact zero, then the contractor is truly sharing in
the contract cost because in the case of an overrun he could
be faced with net losses.
It is important to note that if a maximum and minimum fee
are negotiated, then these are the points where contractor
25

sharing ceases and the contract becomes essentially a Cost-
Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) contract. This differs from the FPI
contract which has a ceiling price, and in the event of an
overrun beyond ceiling price the Government ceases to share
and the contract becomes firm fixed-price.
There are a variety of contractual instruments that could
be adapted for a particular acquisition. The selection of
the best form for the situation at hand is a vital facet of
an acquisition strategy. The choice can directly affect the
degree of competition, cost, schedule and performance char-
acteristics .
C. PROJECT MANAGEMENT
A significant decision that must be made regarding the
acquisition strategy for a major acquisition concerns the
management of the effort. That is to say, will a project
team be created or will the existing activity hierarchy
assimilate the major acquisition as an extension of business
as usual. The use of the concept of a project is as follows:
"A combination of human and non-human resources pulled to-
gether in a temporary organization to achieve a specific
purpose" [7:184]. Given that a "how-to-manage" decision must
be made, then how does one decide when to use project tech-
niques? Cleland and King cite a number of situations that
could promote or reinforce a decision to use project tech-
niques [7:198]. 1) Magnitude of the effort is one such criteria,
26

The issue of size is relative, however, if a particular
effort mandates more resources (manpower/money/material) than
are normally needed for an activity action; then project tech-
niques may be warranted. 2) Unfamiliarity is another occur-
rence that could render the project organization as being
desirable. An action that is other than routine is a prime
candidate for a project classification. 3) Another factor to
consider in the decision regarding the establishment of a pro-
ject is the degree of interdependence existing between the
tasks of the action. If the action necessitates the coordin-
ation and cooperation of many functionally separated activities,
then the project technique could be beneficial. "Project tech-
niques provide a logical approach to the organizational rela-
tionships and problems encountered in the integration of the
work" [7:198].
The final circumstances that will be delineated that could
promote a decision to use a project structure are as follows:
[7:201]
1) High risks, and environmental factors such that an
accurate prediction of the future is difficult,
2) Multiple objectives exist- -the accomplishment of
which requires that a multitude of people work
together,
3) A Government procurement agency requires a project
oriented approach*
If the decision is made to utilize the concept of project
management, then some thought must be given as to how to or-
ganize the team. The project organization could be comprised
27

of functional personnel in addition to selected individuals
assembled to accomplish the particular task. This form of
structure is classified as being a matrix organization.
Operational realization of the matrix organization can vary
in format. The extremes include situations where the project
manager has all project personnel working directly for him in
a line capacity, to the opposite extreme in which the project
manager serves in the capacity of facilitator or coordinator.
Regardless of the structure, the essence of the relationship
is that the project manager can accomplish few functions alone
Accordingly, he must work through people and manage the pro-
ject interaction.
What components should be orchestrated to formulate an
effective project organization? The effort will be facili-
tated by first assigning a competent project manager and then
delegating to this person clear authority and responsibility
[7:243]. The next phase is to assign to the project manager
the necessary resources to accomplish the action. "To select
the human resources requires that the overall project be
divided into subtasks ... until the project is represented by
an alignment of rational, related, recognizable work units"
[7:243]. This divisional action is best accomplished by the
project manager working jointly with the functional managers
who will be supporting the project. What functional groups
or special tasks could/should be considered in the formulation
of "the project team"? The project team could include
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functional groups with responsibility for: [7:243]
1) Developing the general project requirements, e.g.,
formulating the overall project plan,
2) Preparation of the appropriate product specifications,
3) Establishing the system's reliability, maintainability
and supportability requirements,
4) Negotiating and administering all project associated
contracts,
5) Developing, coordinating project schedule and cost
control criteria,
6) Planning for the installation and operation of the
final product,
7) Identifying and developing the appropriate personnel
skills necessary to use the final product.
D. LIFE CYCLE COSTING
Life cycle costing (LCC) is an analysis that could be
incorporated into an acquisition strategy because its purpose
is to obtain the best performance for the lowest total cost
of ownership [14:1-1], Additionally, LCC can be proficiently
planned and executed via the project team mechanism just
discussed. Before these points are developed, an identifi-
cation of the essence of LCC is in order. The life cycle of
an item begins with a feasibility study for its production
and use. Development, production, utilization and ultimate
last item disposal constitute the remaining facets of an
asset's life cycle analysis [14:1-1] . "The life cycle cost
of an item is the total cost incurred in the research, devel-
opment, production, operation and disposal of an item" [14:1-1]
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The total cost of ownership is that subset of the life cycle
cost which is incurred by a using activity. A key issue is
that tradeoffs like cost benefit analysis may support an
optimum vice minimum life cycle cost.
If the concept of LCC is incorporated as part of the
acquisition strategy, then a determination must be made re-
garding which cost categories are relevant for acquisition
analysis. Potential LCC cost categories include source
selection, acquisition, support, and disposal. The general
"support" area can be divided into relevant subsets such as
maintenance, inventory management, training, inspection and
acceptance, transportation and operation [14:1-7]. The pro-
ject management team establishment would facilitate the
attainment and analysis of these cost category data as func-
tional specialists exist within a matrix organization.
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III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE NISTARS ACQUISITION
A. NISTARS ACQUISITION STRATEGY
The purpose of Chapter II was to establish the framework
for the concept of acquisition strategy by a discussion of
selected relevant topics. In this Chapter, those issues will
be developed with a focus on the NISTARS program. What was
the acquisition strategy for the NISTARS project? How was
this strategy to be implemented? Before delineating the par-
ameters of the acquisition strategy as it is documented in the
NISTARS procurement plan, however, a discussion of some of the
relevant factors influencing the NISTARS acquisition strategy
formulation is warranted.
B. EXISTING WAREHOUSING SYSTEMS
NISTARS is an evolutionary extension of the Warehouse
Information Process Control System (WICS) , Depot Integrated
Storage and Retrieval System (DISARS) and the Automated Stor-
age Kitting and Retrieval System (ASKARS) automated warehous-
ing systems previously cited. Before drafting the NISTARS
acquisition strategy, the NSC Oakland purchasing department
evaluated past automated warehousing acquisitions so as to
infer and possibly incorporate lessons learned. In the case
of the WICS acquisition, the negotiation process was used
with the final result that a firm fixed-price (FFP) contract
was awarded to the low offeror. Delivery of WICS was
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significantly delayed because of constructive changes, spec-
ification changes, and production problems. Additionally,
acceptance was based upon a simulated test and at the time
of the formulation of the NISTARS acquisition plan, WICS had
failed to meet the desired throughput requirement. Under
DISARS, the acquisition was started as a two-step formally
advertised firm-fixed-price procurement. Two of the forty-
four firms solicited responded. One of the responding firms
eventually dropped out allegedly because of an adverse per-
ception of the project's financial risk. The acquisition was
negotiated on a sole source basis. The ASKARS system was be-
gun initially as a two-step formally advertised procurement;
however, the receipt of only one proposal resulted in a
conversion of the advertised solicitation into a negotiation.
Interestingly, the same contractor was awarded the WICS,
ASKARS and DISARS contracts.
Analysis of these past acquisitions by the NSC Oakland
Purchasing Department established the following: [18]
1. There is a paucity of firms that are either capable
of performance or desire to undertake a Government automatic
warehousing project.
2. The financial risk associated with the project was
perceived by some potential offerors as being significant
enough to preclude their seeking the award.
3. Financial risk in the guise of cost escalation is
a potentially significant factor that must be planned for.
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4. Both. ASKARS and DISARS used a detailed design spec-
ification with performance parameters. Since a significant
portion of the Department of Defense's automated warehouse
knowledge comes from these systems, use of a design specifi-
cation would favor a particular prior sole source contractor.
Accordingly, it was anticipated that the use of a performance
specification would stimulate competition and subsequently a
broader-based effort to develop a technically innovative
approach.
5. The development cost associated with an integrated
process controlled warehousing system is substantial; accord-
ingly, providing a large base over which to distribute these
costs could facilitate attaining competition.
6. The ASKARS/DISARS sole source contractor had already
recouped some development costs, ergo he was in a position to
underbid potential competitors. A multiple site and multi-
year funding approach was envisioned by NSC Oakland as mediums
to expand the base and thereby promote competition.
7. A number of firms had exhibited tendencies ranging
from a general reluctance to a blatant refusal to bid on Gov-
ernment contracts because under formal advertising the award
would be made solely on the basis of price. Accordingly, NSC
Oakland desired to develop a source selection plan in which
technical factors, in addition to price, could be considered.
C. ACQUISITION ALTERNATIVES
The NSC Oakland Purchasing Department considered the




1) Sole source performance specification procurement
of the NISTARS system from the DISARS and ASKARS
contractor.
2) Competitively buying the hardware and then buying
the software and system integration from the DISARS
and ASKARS sole source contractor.
3) Competitively buying the NISTARS system using a
two-phased procurement with a delayed submission
of pricing proposals.
The first alternative was rejected by NSC Oakland because
of their inability to justify a non-competitive sole source
NISTARS acquisition. Their rejection rationale was as follows
The DISARS and ASKARS contractor has a limited capacity to
manufacture material handling equipment and process control-
lers; accordingly, NISTARS contractual performance would
involve a significant subcontracting effort. A competitive
market exists for these standard commercial items which are
projected to constitute 60 - 75 percent of the system cost [18]
In view of these latter facts, a hardware component breakout
with some sole source procurement was deemed by NSC Oakland
to be a more desirable acquisition approach. This second
alternative could result in coordination problems and an ele-
vated cost risk. These potential adverse features were traded
off initially by the fact that the Government's goal to strive
for competition was served and this fact could promote a
favorable source selection scrutiny by higher authority. Al-
ternative number two ultimately was rejected for the following
reasons: [18]
1. The anticipated significant increase in the number of
in-house resources needed to manage such a project,
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2. The perceived increases in program risk,
3. The rationale for software and integration sole
source procurement was viewed as being weak, given
that the necessary knowledge and technology were
available to other firms.
The third alternative of competively buying the NISTARS using
a two-phase procurement with a delayed submission of pricing
was the selected medium to effect the acquisition. It was
envisioned that this method would best withstand high level
review in addition to promoting system competition as the
element of sole source bias was eliminated on the front end
of the acquisition. A lack of response to the RFP by accept-
able offerors could result in NISTARS being acquired from the
prior sole source contractor; however, it was perceived that
this potential occurrence would be the result of factors
other than, or in addition to, the NSC acquisition strategy.
The three acquisition alternatives just discussed are
documented in the NSC Oakland NISTARS Procurement Plan [18].
This researcher suggests that one of the following alterna-
tives could have been considered to acquire NISTARS. Contract-
out the development of the NISTARS design specifications and
once the Government possesses this definitive quantification
of the need, the formal advertising (FA) method of acquisition
could be utilized. This approach has two significant laudable
characteristics. First, the Government's acquisition tenant
of soliciting competition is satisfied. Second, the designer
of the specifications could be made to bear any cost burden
attributed to ineffectual specifications. A modification of
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this acquisition alternative is the following. First, con-
tract-out for the development of the NISTARS design specifi-
cations and then, given the specifications, the hardware could
be competitively acquired by the Government and provided as
Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) to the NISTARS integrat-
ing contractor. If the Government did not desire to have the
risks and responsibilities associated with GFE, then a second
strategy alternative could be executed. The NSC Oakland Pur-
chasing Department broadly classified the project's risk
components into two main categories: risks attendant to the
material handling equipment and risks attendant to software
development and system integration. The material handling
equipment was perceived as being standard commercial, and
readily available. Therefore, a firm-fixed-price contractual
instrument could be used to effect the acquisition of the
hardware requirements mandated by the contracted-out design
specifications. NSC Oakland attributed significant cost and
technical risk to both the software development and the system
integration efforts. Therefore, a cost reimbursement con-
tractual instrument could be adapted to consummate this facet
of the NISTARS acquisition. This approach could involve more
front-end and project duration administrative effort by the
procurement staff, but it is suggested that the project's
risk components would be more directly addressed which in turn




In the NISTARS RFP , the FPI (firm target) type of contract
was cited as the "anticipated" result to the solicitation. In
an effort to be perceived as reasonable and not to dissuade any
potential offerors from competing, NSC Oakland qualified their
documented anticipation with the statement that "the final
selection of a contract type will be based on negotiations
and the logic of the individual situation" (19:15). Addition-
ally, offerors were encouraged to submit their plans and ra-
tionale for alternative contractual formats. In order to
provide a common basis for evaluation and award, NSC Oakland
articulated the cost sharing ratios and ceiling price to be
used by the offerors in phase two (price proposals). The FPI
firm target common basic parameters were 85/15 above target,
60/40 below target and a ceiling of 130%. Two divergent
opinions emerged regarding the level, purpose and potential
result of the below target numbers. The NSC Oakland NISTARS
acquisition team believed that a 60/40 below target ratio was
both fair and necessary to compensate contractor risk and to
promote competition since they perceived a substantial cost
risk for a new firm (other than the prior sole source con-
tractor) to develop the NISTARS software and to subsequently
integrate it into the NISTARS system. Higher authority had
a different perception as to the possible impact of a 60/40
below target share ratio. Their primary concern was that the
60/40 ratio was so much of an incentive to come in under tar-
get price that the following adverse effects could result:
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1. The contractor might cut corners and compromise quality
to maximize his monetary return.
2. The NISTARS contract could become an extreme admin-
istrative burden because the contractor might attempt
to either change the targets or change the contract
scope in an effort to generate and preserve a high
below- target windfall. An appendix to the RFP
established the fact that the below-target share
ratio was changed to be 85/15.
This researcher suggests that there are other types of
contracts besides the FPI firm target that could be applicable
for the NISTARS acquisition. Before developing the contract-
ual alternatives, the following brief statement of some of the
environmental constraints is provided [18].
1. The NISTARS Project has a firm performance requirement.
2. The Government has a high expectation of technical
success
.
3. The cost risk associated with software development
and system integration is substantial, particularly
for a new firm entering the field.
4. FFP contracts had previously been used to acquire
automated warehousing systems from a sole source
contractor. NSC Oakland's perception was that an
overt attempt on their part to contract NISTARS with
a FFP instrument could result in reduced competition.
5. Present economic conditions are such that the cost
of money to contractors and general financial
uncertainty are particularly high.
6. A contractor induced schedule slippage can result in
$3000 per day in damages.
D. POTENTIAL NISTARS CONTRACTUAL FORMATS
In a FFP contract the price is agreed upon before the
award of a definitive contract. As the name implies, the
price remains firm unless the contractual parameters are
38

changed in accordance with the provisos of the Changes Clause
or any bilaterally agreed to change. A major consideration
associated with this type of contract is that the contractor
assumes full cost responsibility. Given the NISTARS environ-
mental constraints previously cited, coupled with the Govern-
ment's desire to obtain competition, this researcher suggests
that the FFP contract would not be the optimal instrument if
NISTARS is to be acquired with one contract. As was previously
discussed, a FFP contract could be appropriate for the hardware
break-out since there is a perceived minimal cost risk exposure
associated with this portion of the NISTARS acquisition.
A cost-plus- fixed- fee (CPFF) contract could be used for
the NISTARS procurement; however this researcher suggests that
it also is not the optimal form of contract because: (1) the
Government bears all the risk, (2) the contractor is not in-
centivized to improve performance and reduce costs, (3) the
contractor's fee is fixed even if actual costs greatly exceed
original estimates, and (4) the Government may find it neces-
sary to allocate more time and resources to administer contract
performance (since the contractor has no risk or cost reduction
incentive)
,
If the contractual parties believe that the cost uncertain-
ties' associated with performance are so significant that a
reasonable and mutually acceptable ceiling price cannot be
negotiated, then a cost-plus-incentive-fee contract (CPIF)
could be used for NISTARS. The NISTARS acquisition is comprised
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of diverse risk components. As has previously been discussed,
the material handling equipment elements of the acquisition
were perceived to be relatively risk free (from the standpoint
of cost escalation). The software development and system
integration aspects of the project were anticipated to have a
greater impact on schedule and performance and less influence
on cost escalation. The United States economy is particu-
larly dynamic during the mid-1980 timeframe; accordingly
contractors were reluctant to accept a contract that would
have the effect of financially binding them. A relevant side-
line point is that the NISTARS RFP has an economic price
adjustment (labor and materials) provision which is intended
to reduce the contractors' perceived potential "dynamic econ-
omy" financial vulnerability. This researcher is of the
opinion that the CPIF contract is the best form of the cost
reimbursement contracts that could be applied to the NISTARS
acquisition. However, the FPI contract, as defined in the
NISTARS RFP with its 130% ceiling, offers reasonable risk
protection for both the Government and the contractor and
incentives sufficient in scope to induce the contractors to
a high level of performance. NSC Oakland's anticipation of
concluding the solicitation with a FPI NISTARS contract is
viewed by this researcher as being fair, reasonable and re-




The success or lack thereof of the selected strategy to
competitively buy the NISTARS system on a multi-year basis
via a two-phased procurement hinged on the ability of NSC
Oakland to stimulate and obtain competition. The Purchasing
Department realized that their goal to obtain competition
could be enhanced if the industry perceived that their risks
would be reasonably and responsibly addressed by the Govern-
ment. The NISTARS Procurement Plan contains a section entitled
"Risk Overview" in which the following points are made regard-
ing the project's risk components. The NISTARS project re-
quirements do not exceed the limits of existing technology;
however, the necessary software will have to be developed as
"ready-made" programs are not available. This factor was not
anticipated to cause a significant problem since the software
requirements were well within the current capability of the
industry [18] . The following impact statement is included so
as to put the NISTARS project magnitude in perspective.
NISTARS goes beyond existing commercial and military
systems in the areas of throughput and the number and
complexity of items received and issued.
For example, the WICS requirement was 5,000 transactions per
eight-hour day; DISARS was 8,000 and NISTARS was to be 18,000
[18].
The prospect that NISTARS might fail in attaining the
required throughput was perceived as the project's major tech-
nical risk. The WICS project was studied by the NSC Oakland
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NISTARS Acquisition Team so as to be able to discern what cir-
cumstances impaired the success of this effort. The following
lesson influenced the formulation of the NISTARS acquisition
strategy. The WICS process controller is core-limited and
not susceptible to expansion. In an effort to ensure the
realization of the required response times, the NISTARS spec-
ifications are demanding in this area to the extent that it
is hoped that this potential problem will be averted. The
WICS system utilizes order-picking vehicles which are linked
to the process controller via wire guidance lines. A signif-
icant problem concerns the fact that data transmissions are
frequently impaired because electromagnetic impulses in the
line induce unscheduled process controller shutdowns. So as
to eliminate this type of system vulnerability, the NISTARS
solicitation requires that if the offerors propose the use of
order-picking vehicles, then the communication must be accom-
plished by a medium other than wire guidance. The final point
that will be made regarding the technical risk components
concerns the acceptance procedure.
The WICS acceptance was conducted in the following fashion,
It was based on a test in which contractor personnel operated
a significant portion of the system that had been contractor-
loaded with dummy material (empty boxes). Post-acceptance and
under actual operational conditions, the WICS system has been
unable to duplicate the desired 5,000 transaction throughput
that was achieved during the simulated acceptance test.
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Accordingly, NISTARS will be loaded with actual material by
Navy operators six months prior to the acceptance testing.
The acceptance test will be performed by Navy personnel using
actual transactions in an effort to affirm that the required
throughputs are in fact achieved and the real world performance
shortfalls that the WICS acceptance format obscured are avoided.
At its inception NISTARS was planned as a separate acqui-
sition action for the three selected project sites. Execution
of this original plan would have contributed to an increase
in the project's cost risk as there would have been redundant
contractor development costs. So as to reduce the adverse
impact of this facet of cost risk, a multi-site, single con-
tractor award goal was included in the acquisition strategy.
This method could eliminate repetitive concurrent expensive
multi-contractor software development costs in addition to
permitting a single contractor the opportunity to obtain
quantity discounts. Additionally, the proposed use of multi-
year contracting for the multi-site project provided another
medium to reduce cost risk since multi-year contracting would
also give the contractor the opportunity to place advance
orders for the NISTARS hardware and thereby accrue trade dis-
counts or an inflation hedge. As was mentioned earlier, the
material handling equipment costs could constitute up to 75%
of the total system cost, accordingly there would be an oppor-
tunity for significant savings. The drawback to multi-year
contracting is that if the second year funding does not
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materialize, then the cost of the cancellation ceiling will
have to be absorbed.
The last risk factor that will be discussed addresses the
possibility of schedule slippage. In fact, a timely delivery
could be hampered by a basic NISTARS acquisition strategy
tenant of obtaining wide competition since a new contractor
would probably encounter development or implementation prob-
lems that had already been resolved by the previous automated
warehousing system sole source contractor. The NISTARS pro-
ject was initially justified and subsequently funded because
of the projected manpower savings. A schedule slippage could
impair or entirely preclude this anticipated NISTARS benefit.
Additionally, late delivery of the project could precipitate
management problems for the three Naval Supply Centers as it
would be difficult to plan for and effect a timely, smooth
and equitable transition from a labor intense operation to
an automated process if an explicit operational date for
NISTARS is not known.
The NSC Oakland NISTARS procurement plan contains the
affirmation that the project acquisition strategy was designed
to stimulate and obtain competition. "Utilizing past procure-
ment history, the NISTARS procurement has been designed to
attract competition" [NISTARS PCO] . Some of the actions that
were planned to promote competition have been articulated;
however, the discussion would not be complete unless the
NISTARS pre-solicitation conference was mentioned.
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F. PRE- SOLICITATION CONFERENCE
The 31 January 1979 conference had two purposes:
1) To give visibility to the imminent acquisition,
2) To give industry an opportunity to and a forum
from which, to provide an input on the specifications.
The specific date for the conference was given wide dissemin-
ation via individual letters sent to 28 prospective offerors
whose names had been obtained by interrogating the NISTARS
project office, the ASKARS and DISARS negotiators and the
Thomas Register, as well as a notice published in the Commerce
Business Daily concerning the pre-solicitation conference.
Twenty-six firms attended the pre-solicitation conference.
The agenda for the conference included a presentation of an
overview of NISTARS and the proposed procurement plan by the
NSC Director of Purchasing, the distribution of the proposed
specification to the attendees, and an opening of the confer-
ence for general discussion. Some of the questions from
potential offerors which surfaced during the discussion indi-
cated that a number of firms had never transacted business
with the Government or their business had always been con-
ducted on a formally-advertised firm-fixed-price basis. This
insight was valuable since a broad-based industry naivete re-
garding Government acquisition precepts or a general reluctance
or fear to conduct business with the Government could preclude
the attainment of competition. Accordingly, during the dis-
cussion, the Director of Purchasing made an overt effort to
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resolve or at least mollify some of the ambiguity that some
of the attendees alleged pervades Government acquisition. A
review of the conference minutes established that the follow-
ing points were made by the NSC Oakland Director of Purchasing,
The fact that the NISTARS contractor would be selected utiliz-
ing formal source selection criteria was emphasized. The
logic for using this method of source selection was explained
by affirming that it produces an objective, well-documented
evaluation of all proposals. The explicit parameters of the
formal source selection process were clarified. The Source
Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) was identified as the entity
that evaluated the technical aspects of the proposals. The
fact that these individuals do not know the weights of the
evaluation factors or the pricing data was emphasized. The
Source Selection Advisory Council (SSAC) was presented as a
group "that develops the weight for the raw data supplied to
them by the SSEB, marries pricing information with the tech-
nical inputs and then provides ranked recommendations to the
Source Selection Authority (SSA)." The SSA ultimately makes
the decision as to which contractor wins the award. The NSC
Director of Purchasing emphasized that the entire evaluation
and selection process is an objective team effort [Appendix C]
The NISTARS request for proposals called for the initial
submission of unpriced technical proposals. The rationale for
this action was that during the pre-solicitation conference
the contractors indicated a reluctance to expend resources in
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the development of initial cost data when their proposal could
be deemed unacceptable or project technical changes could ren-
der their initial pricing effort worthless. Given that per-
formance specifications were used in the RFP , the likelihood
of technical changes was perceived by the contractors as being
significant. The fact that the NSC Oakland Purchasing Depart-
ment felt that some of the logic expressed by the contractors
was applicable to the Government is indicated by the PCO's
statement that "Because of the time required for technical
discussion, the initial prices could only be used as gross
estimates." Additionally, NSC Oakland believed that it would
be an unproductive endeavor for the Government and the offer-
ors to attempt a reconciliation of the initial pricing and
the final offers. The NSC Oakland Purchasing Director thought
that it would be equally wasteful to utilize Government re-
sources to audit initial pricing proposals. An ancillary
benefit that would result by the delayed submission of pricing
data concerns the fact that the opportunity for information
leaks during technical evaluation would be reduced.
During the conference, the Government's basic justifica-
tion for implementing NISTARS was affirmed as being a trade-
off between a present expenditure for capital equipment and
potential future savings on operational costs and reduced
manning levels. The projected manpower savings would be lost
if the project schedule slipped, so the rationale for the
negative incentive of a $3000/day liquidated damages proviso
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contained in the solicitation was explained. This negative
incentive was contrasted with the positive incentive to he
incorporated into the anticipated contract. The proposed
fixed-price incentive contract parameters of a 130% ceiling
and share ratios of 85/15 above and 60/40 below target were
articulated [19:23]. (The share ratios were changed to 85/15
above and below target by an amendment to the solicitation
dated 2 April 1980.) NSC Oakland's desire in constructing
this contractual format was to indicate the Government's sen-
sitivity to the contractor's risk in addition to providing a
mechanism to enhance profit. This researcher would observe
that the pre-solicitation conference was an intense effort by
NSC Oakland to communicate positively with industry as to the
Government's position in an effort to stimulate understanding
and competition regarding the NISTARS requirement. Addition-
ally, it appeared that the participants were heartily encour-
aged to be involved in the specification formulation and to
suggest and justify mechanisms by which the Government could
or should buy NISTARS.
1. Strategy Summarized
At this point a succinct summarization of the NISTARS
acquisition strategy is in order. The strategy used or anti-
cipated includes the following:
1) Broad based communications,
2) Application of formal source selection criteria,
3) Multi-year and multi-site contracting,
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4] Use of performance specifications,
5) Incentives (both positive and negative)
,
6) Project management techniques,
7) Competition,
8) Two-stage negotiations,
9) Technical acceptance based on actual real-world
conditions
.
G. MANAGEMENT OF THE NISTARS PROJECT
The degree to which an acquisition strategy can be success-
ful is directly influenced by the management structure that is
established to develop, monitor and effect its execution. The
purpose of this section is to delineate some of the key players
and organizations involved with the management of NISTARS.
During 1977, the Navy was extremely interested in studying
existing automated warehousing systems so as to infer the
applicability and desirability of such installations at Naval
Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) stock points. The decision
was made to proceed with the development and installation of
a mechanized warehousing system. Therefore, NAVSUP deemed it
necessary to establish "a special headquarters group and pro-
ject team to plan, develop, coordinate and implement the
integrated warehousing systems project at Naval Supply Centers
in the 1980-1981 timeframe" [20:1] . A NAVSUP notice dated 21
September 1978 (Appendix B) established a project office hier-
archy for NISTARS. Some of the ''major considerations" for
the project management group which were articulated in the
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notice include: (1) to determine specifications against
which, contractors will bid for the warehousing system, (2)
to examine alternatives available to provide an integrated
warehousing system, (3) to assure that the implementation of
the integrated warehousing system is effected in a timely
manner, in conformance with available funding, and (4) to
perform as the functional manager for the integrated ware-
housing system and coordinate and interface with the project
officer at the selected naval supply center implementation
sites [20:2]. Effective 1 October 1978, a formal project
organization was established which had the structure cited
in Appendix B.
Even though the NAVSUP notice called for a "project team,"
the promulgation of the Notice had a particularly interesting
and relevant result, in that a distinctly different opinion
regarding who should manage NISTARS emerged. This opinion
regarding NISTARS management was based upon the belief that
the management group established by the Notice would function
in an "informal, not fully dedicated to NISTARS mode" rather
than as an integrated, fully dedicated project team [22:1].
This suggestion was based in part upon the fact that the
NISTARS management group as established in accordance with
the Notice would retain functional organizational responsibil-
ities in addition to those required by NISTARS. The logic
espoused by advocates of this different viewpoint was that
NISTARS is a vital project whose success (on schedule, within
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budget and technical sanity) was of utmost importance;
accordingly, a dedicated group, totally responsible for
NISTARS, was necessary. Additionally, proponents of the
project management concept believed that the charter and
organization that was established via the Notice was defi-
cient because: (1) NISTARS acquisition responsibility was
diffused, and (2) organizational placement did not reflect
the acquisition's importance. The establishment of a program
office was suggested as a mechanism to resolve the perceived
deficiencies and to provide the dedicated management neces-
sary for NISTARS. Even though the magnitude of NISTARS does
not technically qualify for mandatory major system program
status, advocates suggested that a project management struc-
ture should be created because it would: (1) provide more
visibility at the NAVSUP Commander's level, (2) bring clearly
dedicated resources to the project, and (3) clearly establish
responsibility for the project in one person. The suggested
professional personality of the proposed program manager was
that he be a Supply Corps Captain with system acquisition
experience. The final points made by the proponents of a
NISTARS program office were that there are a number of indi-
viduals who satisfy the suggested profile criteria and who
would be eager for the opportunity to run the vital NISTARS
project. The bottom line recommendation was that NAVSUP
approve the concept of a NISTARS project office and subse-




The NISTARS program manager concept is contrasted with
the other method considered for the management of NISTARS
which was to conform to the integrated warehousing systems
group (project office) as established by the NAVSUP notice.
Both positions were presented to NAVSUP and the subsequent
decision was to comply with the structure as delineated in
the Notice. A brief discussion of the manner in which this
project organization was executed follows.
In January of 1979, the Deputy Director, Materials and
Facilities Division was assigned the additional responsibil-
ities of project group leader as defined in the NAVSUP notice
This individual is a materials handling equipment expert who
brought a high level of technical expertise to the project.
In April of 1979 another project officer was assigned to
assist with the NISTARS acquisition. This individual is a
senior Supply Corps officer who had previously been assigned
at NSC Oakland as the storage and shipping officer. Because
of this latter tour of duty, he possessed valuable environ-
mental insights and sensitivities for NSC Oakland, the first
NISTARS implementation site. Additionally, while at NSC Oak-
land he had actively participated in the effort to develop
NISTARS performance specifications. As was previously cited,
the development of appropriate specifications was a major
consideration for the project office. Accordingly, this indi-
vidual's experience was of great value to the project office.
Some of the key NSC Oakland players who were to have a
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significant influence on the formation and execution of the
NISTARS acquisition strategy included the first PCO and the
resident NISTARS engineer. Some interesting background facts
concerning these individuals are: (1) the Director of Purchas-
ing, who also served in the capacity of the first NISTARS PCO,
had previous major system acquisition experience, and (2) the
engineer had been a major participant in technical aspects of
the DISARS acquisition. In the Spring of 1980, a senior Supply
Corps officer was ordered into NSC Oakland to assume the re-
sponsibilities of NISTARS PCO. This officer had previously
been the DISARS PCO; accordingly he possessed a considerable
insight into and experience with a prior automated inventory
control warehousing system acquisition.
H. NISTARS AND THE DAVIS- BACON ACT
In addition to the project's management structure, the
degree to which an acquisition strategy can be effectual is
influenced by the impediments to its execution. This
researcher suggests that an acquisition strategy should be
flexible because all contingencies cannot be anticipated and
planned for. The ultimate project impact of the Davis-Bacon
CDB) Act was a potentially significant and unforeseen develop-
ment that necessitated a timely and proper response by the
NISTARS PCO.
The NISTARS project strategy had to be adapted to address
the provision of the Davis-Bacon (DB) Act. Before developing
this point, some background information regarding the Act
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is important. Defense acquisition is subject to legislative
mandates which impose a multitude of socio-economic programs
designed to achieve social vice defense ends. An example is
the Davis-Bacon Act of 1931 which provides: [2:1]
...every contract in excess of $5, 000. . .which involves
the employment of laborers or mechanics in the construc-
tion, alteration, or repair of any public building of
the United States ... shall contain a provision that the
rate of wage for all laborers or mechanics shall not be
less than the prevailing rate of wages for work of a
similar nature in city, village, or civil division of
the state in which the public buildings are located...
In 193 5 a significant and relevant amendment to the DB Act
stipulated that the minimum contract value for DB applica-
bility was to be $2,000 and that the Secretary of Labor was
assigned responsibility and authority to determine the pre-
vailing wage rate in the area of all federally funded con-
struction sites [2:1].
The NISTARS contracting officer was sensitive to the
possibility that an offeror might propose a system that in-
volved construction or alteration work. Since the solicita-
tion specification was performance vice design, it was not
possible at the point of issuance to infer what construction
work, if any, would be required. Accordingly, offerors were
requested to identify proposed building alterations in their
initial technical proposals, in addition to the labor cate-
gories and percent of effort associated with alteration and
modification, separate from that of installation work. The
technical proposals received by the contracting officer
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contained the requested categorization of alteration and in-
stallation work. In an effort not to appear or to be arbitrary,
the contracting officer requested and received technical guid-
ance from the Facilities Planning and Programming Branch of
the Naval Supply Systems Command regarding which NISTARS
performance aspects constituted construction or alteration.
This action was significant because only the construction or
alteration and not installation work falls under the dictates
of the DB Act. The NISTARS PCO obtained legal guidance in
addition to the technical determinations just cited. A legal
review by the project's counsel established the following:
[21:1]
1) DB clauses must be included in a supply contract only
in the event that the contract provides for substantial
(emphasis added) construction, alteration or repair
to a building as defined in the DAR.
2) Offerors should be informed by a modification to the
RFP as to what type of work at the proposed sites
will be considered subject to DB provisions.
3) "Substantial installation" is not synonymous with
"substantial construction."
By an amendment to the RFP dated 2 April 1980, the appro-
priate DAR clauses for construction contracts were incorpor-
ated. More specifically, the amendment affirmed that the
Davis-Bacon Act provisos applied to those portions of work
at the site which altered the structural, mechanical or elec-
trical composition of the buildings in which NISTARS equipment
is to be located. These were the general areas that the
Facilities Planning and Programming Branch had suggested as
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being areas of DB applicability. The drafting and dissemin-
ation of the RFP amendment addressed some but did not neces-
sarily resolve all potential DB problems. For example,
conflicting legal precedent surrounds the issue of DB clause
applicability; accordingly, the NISTARS PCO made a determin-
ation regarding his interpretation of DB scope. Historically,
DB legal precedent includes the "Roach Case" where a ruling
was made that the DB clauses can be selectively applied to
include just the alteration work performed upon a building.
The "Norfolk Solicitation" illustrates a different connotation
of DB applicability as the labor clauses were applied "across-
the-board" to all the labor work performed at the building
site, including erection, setting in place and hooking up of
items [23]. This apparent legal latitude regarding the range
of DB applicability was an issue that the NISTARS PCO desired
to resolve. Accordingly, the following administrative actions
were taken. First, a contracting officer determination was
drafted and filed regarding the application of labor provi-
sions for the NISTARS solicitation. Second, the previously
cited 2 April 1980 RFP amendment was distributed in an attempt
to clarify the Government's DB issue position for potential
contractors. These actions are important because if the
"across- the-board" applicability issue was sanctioned by the
PCO or if it was used by some of the offerors in formulating
their pricing proposals, then a significant project cost
escalation could ensue. This hypothesis is based upon the
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premise that installation wage rates are lower than construc-
tion rates, plus the fact that the Department of Labor (DOL)
determined rates might exceed those which could have been
used in the absence of a DB established labor scale. A major
project cost impact can occur if the DOL determined wage rates
do not reflect the true work site prevailing wages. An ancil-
lary PCO concern was that he wanted to state clearly the
Government's DB interpretation and application so that the
contractors' pricing proposals would have a uniform labor pro-
vision baseline. If the offerors used a different frame of
reference in preparing their pricing proposals, then the SSAC
would have a more difficult time in determining which submis-
sion was best from the standpoint of the price evaluation
criterion constraint. Additionally, the Government might be
viewed as being inconsistent or arbitrary if ineffectual or
non-existent communication resulted in a contractor using
rates which lowered the merit of his proposal or precluded
his receiving the award. The PCO's determination was a par-
ticularly significant action because in each case of a DB
applicability protest, the Comptroller General has upheld
the determination of the contracting officer where the latter,
in good faith, made a reasonable application of the criteria
found in the Government's procurement regulations [24:4].
Equally important to the issue is the ruling where the DAR
was determined to have the force and effect of law and is




A PCO must be sensitive to any factor that could nega-
tively affect the project's schedule; accordingly the NISTARS
PCO wanted to limit the Government's vulnerability to a pro-
test. The PCO envisioned the possibility of a protest as a
result of either the timing of the amendment to the RFP or
the Government's DB applicability position articulated in the
amendment. Accordingly he extended and promulgated an adjusted
date (30 May 1980) for the contractors to submit pricing inputs.
NSC Oakland felt that one effect of this action would be to
place a time limit upon any potential protest of the amendment
because: [24:8]
In the case of negotiated procurements, alleged
improprieties which do not exist in the initial solici-
tation but which are subsequently incorporated therein
must be protested not later than the next closing date
for receipt of proposals following the incorporation.
An interesting and relevant sideline is the Comptroller
General decision which concerns the fact that a failure to
include DB provisions and applicable wage rates cannot be
cured retroactively after award of the contract [9].
At this point it is appropriate to discuss some of the
reasons why NSC Oakland envisions a schedule slip as being a
particularly undesirable occurrence. NISTARS was justified
and Other Procurement Navy (OPN) funding obtained because of
projected manpower and Other Maintenance Navy (OMN) fund
savings. The level of 0M§N funding and the NSC Oakland man-
power ceiling have programmed reductions impacting the year
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that NISTARS is scheduled to come on line. Given the lead
time required to submit and support Five Year Defense Plan
CFYDP) budgetary and manpower changes, a significant adverse
impact could ensue if the project either does not come on line
as planned or does not perform to expectations.
Presently the NSC Purchasing Department is confident that
an orderly reduction of ceiling points to the post-NISTARS
implementation level can evolve even if the explicit acceptance
date for the automated warehousing system is not known. The
transition from a labor intensive process to a mechanized mode
of operation is to be accomplished without a reduction in
force (RIF)
.
The projected rate of decline due to transfer,,
terminations and retirements is viewed by the NISTARS Procure-
ment Team as being adequate to reduce the manning level. If
this projection proves to be overly optimistic, then Oakland
has the early-out voluntary retirement and temporary hire
options to ease scheduling problems associated with the
transition into NISTARS.
This study has contained numerous references to the fact
that NSC Oakland wanted competition to be a vital factor in
the NISTARS acquisition. The efforts by the Purchasing Depart-
ment to obtain and retain competition could induce budgetary
and manpower ceiling point schedule conflicts. The rationale
for suggesting this potential problem is as follows. The
submission dates for th.e technical and pricing proposal inputs
hoth were extended so as to permit all possible offerors ample
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opportunity for preparation. The previously discussed Davis-
Bacon issue was as germane to the potential schedule slippage
subject as NSC Oakland's aspirations for competition. The
combined effect of these two factors was as follows: a con-
tract for NISTARS was originally scheduled to be awarded in
April of 1980; however, the cutoff date for the receipt of
the price proposals has been extended to May 1980. Actual
award is currently projected to occur in September 1980.
J. IMPLEMENTATION CONCERNS
The terms and conditions contained in the RFP stipulate
that the eventual NISTARS contractor will have two years after
the date of the contract to complete performance. 0M§N dollars
and manpower ceiling point reductions are programmed to coincide
with the originally projected NISTARS operational schedule. The
actions by the PCO to extend the technical and price input dates
(to promote competition and to allow reasonable time for a re-
sponse to the DB related RFP amendment) is in direct conflict
with the project officers tasking to get NISTARS in on time.
The ultimate impact of these diverse key project player goals
is presently unknown. Another acquisition strategy implemen-
tation concern is the fact that the Project Manager is geo-
graphically separate from NSC Oakland. The Washington, D.C.
based project officers must traverse the nation if they desire
or are required to participate in on-site strategy formulation
and execution. Time and coordination are not the only con-
straints associated with these sojourns as the current paucity
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of travel funds frequently dictated telephonic or U.S. mail
communication vice on-site liaison. An increase in admin-
istrative lead time and project frustration resulted. The
acquisition strategy precept of utilizing performance specifi-
cations in the solicitation is the basis of yet another imple-
mentation concern. The use of performance specifications does
complement the goal of attaining competition as the potential
approach of the contractor is less structured, in addition to
the fact that the past automated warehousing sole source con-
tractor was not given an unfair advantage that could have been
the case if a definitive specification had been used. However,
concern stems from the fact that no one knows for sure if
NISTARS will in fact perform. The SSEB had to rely on "pro-
fessional judgment" in order to infer which proposals appeared
to be technically acceptable. The merit of the winning pro-
posal will not be firmly established until well into or after
performance. When interviewed, the Director of Purchasing
remarked that it had been his intention to buy a simulation
program so that the parameters of the various NISTARS techni-
cal proposals could be verified as to performance feasibility.
The FYDP lead time requirements mandated a tight project
schedule which precluded the development of the simulation
model which could have possibly eliminated, some of the ambi-




What is simulation? A general definition is "manipulation
of a model in such a way that reality is imitated" [33:499].
The reason for considering the incorporation of this type of
modeling in the NISTARS acquisition strategy was previously
cited as being an extension of the Project Manager/PCO desire
to reduce the technical uncertainty associated with the use of
performance specifications. The NSC Oakland purchasing team
elected not to pursue the use of simulation because they per-
ceived that the tight project schedule precluded its develop-
ment. However, this researcher would like to reflect briefly
upon the considerations and possible results had the simulation
option been utilized. Obtaining and using a good simulation
model could have resulted in the following significant and
desirable advantages [33:450]. First, the SSEB would have
had the opportunity to experiment with the different variables
in the technical proposals to determine performance validity
and merit. Second, simulation modeling is amenable to time
compression; accordingly the NSC Oakland purchasing team could
have gotten a feel for proposal performance feasibility before
award as opposed to waiting two years for the selected NISTARS
contractor to perform. In an effort to balance the discussion,
these two suggested simulation advantages are contrasted with
the following potential disadvantages. The construction of a
simulation model can be a slow and costly process which may
not prove successful. An additional consideration is the fact
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that an accurate simulation model requires an intimate know-
ledge of the problem and, since the software and integration
aspects of NISTARS are highly sophisticated, this knowledge
may not be readily acquired. If the Government's simulation
model does not have credibility, then its use could diminish
the degree of competition as contractors could be reluctant
to invest time and money in the development of a technical
proposal that could receive a perceived arbitrary evaluation.
Furthermore, the use of simulation by the Government could
evoke a contractor protest because a particular contractor
could be excluded on the basis that his technical proposal
was inferred to be unacceptable in light of the Government's
simulation model. If, however, the contractor had his own
simulation model and his approach was consistent with the
model, then discussions or litigation could ensue as to the
appropriateness of the various models.
L. LIFE CYCLE COST CONSIDERATIONS
The NSC Oakland NISTARS Procurement Plan contains an
appendix entitled "Life Cycle Costs CLCC)." Included is the
documented determination which reflects Oakland's decision
not to incorporate LCC as part of the NISTARS acquisition
strategy. When queried as to why this particular determina-
tion was made, the Director of Purchasing stated that the
necessary time and in-house resources did not exist to perform
an LCC applicability and benefit analysis. The purpose of
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this section is to evaluate how LCC could have been applied
to the NISTARS acquisition.
The Life Cycle Cost of an item is defined as its total
cost at the end of its life, including all expenses for re-
search and development, production, operation, support,
maintenance, disposal and other costs of ownership, less any
residual salvage value at the end of its lifetime [14:1-1].
This researcher suggests that one medium by which NSC Oakland
could have incorporated LCC into the NISTARS acquisition
strategy, given the paucity of people and time constraint, is
as follows. The RFP could have been constructed to reflect
the fact that LCC would be a highly ranked evaluation criteria.
A contractor who effectively structured his proposal into a
viable life cycle costing format could receive significant
credit. If LCC were to be an integral aspect of the NISTARS
acquisition strategy, then it would be necessary to structure
the personnel complement of the SSEB to ensure that qualified
individuals would be present in sufficient numbers to properly
evaluate the LCC applicability of various proposals. Before
the Government would include LCC as a major criterion in the
NISTARS RFP, a significant benefit attributable to this meth-
odology would have to be anticipated. Accordingly, a discus-
sion of some of the considerations and constraints associated
with LCC is warranted. Mr. Robert Seldon articulated the
following LCC considerations in his book, Life Cycle Costing:
A Better Method of Government Procurement [29].
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(1) Can explicit performance requirements be written? (2)
Will the life of the product be long enough to make operating
and support costs a significant part of the total cost? C3)
Are enough historical data available to permit a reasonable
analysis of LCC? 4. Is the additional time required for LCC
analysis acceptable? (J>) Do both the buyer and the seller
have the management resources to carry out LCC analysis? If
the Government could have handled these issues in a reasonable
fashion so that LCC could have been used in the NISTARS acqui-
sition strategy, then the following advantages might have
resulted: (1) The LCC estimating process can provide manage-
ment with a comprehensive overall quantitative picture of a
product's life cycle; (2) Promulgation of the Government's
intent to utilize LCC analysis in the NISTARS project may have
stimulated increased contractor interest in operating and
support plans; and (3) If the contractor management became
interested in and involved with NISTARS problems, then a
better designed product might have resulted. NSC Oakland's
ability to use LCC in the NISTARS acquisition strategy would
be constrained by how much credibility the analysis format
had with higher authority that had to approve the NSC Oakland
procurement plan. If LCC had been included, the following
forms of resistance might have been encountered. A political
objection to incurring front-end costs which are alleged to
result in later economies in operation and support. A differ-
ent perspective of political resistance could manifest itself
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if LCC is equated to being a pseudo "total package procure-
ment." The cost overruns attributed to this later acquisition
format are well remembered in Government. (3) Higher level
authority may question the merit of LCC as a methodology and
the validity of any data obtained to evaluate its merit.
Resistance to LCC could additionally come from contractors
who might be reluctant to provide and be bound to quantified
estimates unless they can control the costs.
The basic goal of LCC is to minimize total cost and cost
risk of a project. It is conceivable that LCC could make a
significant contribution toward realizing these goals. How-
ever, its applicability and selection for use involves a
tradeoff with other factors such as performance, schedule and
immediate cost. In the case of NISTARS, schedule constraints
precluded the use of the LCC analysis option.
M. SUMMARY
The purpose of this Chapter has been to articulate the
explicit parameters of the NISTARS acquisition strategy form-
ulation and execution so as to facilitate a comparison of the
NISTARS acquisition strategy with the fundamental acquisition
strategy issues that were developed in Chapter II. Areas
developed in Chapter III included a general NISTARS strategy
statement, a discussion of existing warehousing systems,
amplification of NISTARS acquisition alternatives, a reflec-
tion on potential NISTARS contractual formats, an evaluation
of project risk, a review of the presolicitation conference,
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a discussion of the NISTARS management structure evolution,
the constraints and provisions of the Davis-Bacon Act, imple-
mentation concerns, and some of the considerations associated
with LCC and simulation.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The purpose of this study has been to identify and analyze
the NISTARS acquisition strategy. A brief reflection on some
of the key areas and issues that were developed follows. A
fundamental question that had to be resolved was, "What was
to be the management structure for NISTARS?" The monetary
scope, impact and the sophistication of the applied acquisi-
tion technique mandated that personnel resources, in addition
to those available at NSC Oakland, would be required for man-
agement of the project. The considerations associated with
the two viewpoints regarding potential project managerial
structure were developed and the high level decision that
NISTARS was to be managed by a NAVSUP-based group was cited.
A paramount concept that pervades Government procurement
policy, regulation and the acquisition strategy for NISTARS
is competition. NSC Oakland made an overt effort to conduct
the NISTARS acquisition in an open environment that would
promote competition. The pre-solicitation conference was an
example that was developed to illustrate how the Government
attempted to use open communication to maximize the opportunity
for competition. A key method used to facilitate competition
in the NISTARS project was the use of performance specifica-
tions. The logic for using performance specifications parallels
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that found in OMB Circular A-109, namely a potential con-
tractor's approach is less constrained and accordingly he is
free to develop an innovative and creative response to a
Government need. The merit and value of performance specifi-
cation usage can be diminished if there is a significant un-
certainty associated with whether they will in fact precipitate
the desired system performance levels. The general concept
of simulation was discussed and the suggestion was made that
the use of this technique could possibly minimize or eliminate
performance uncertainty attributed to a performance specifica-
tion-based solicitation. The tight project schedule precluded
the development of a NISTARS simulation program. NSC Oakland's
sensitivity to the project's time constraints also eliminated
Life Cycle Costing (LCC) analysis from being applied to the
acquisition. Even though LCC was not incorporated into the
NISTARS acquisition strategy, some of the basic precepts and
a suggestion of how the technique could have been applied were
discussed.
The critical items that NSC Oakland learned and incorpor-
ated from their analysis of past automated warehousing system
acquisitions have been presented. For example, Oakland's per-
ception that the use of a FFP contract would give a bias or
unfair competitive advantage to the previous sole-source con-
tractor diminished its consideration for use. NSC Oakland's
logic for anticipating a FPI instrument for NISTARS was
articulated. The insights that the NISTARS acquisition team
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obtained from their analysis of past automated warehousing
system acquisitions influenced the formulation of the dis-
cussed acquisition alternatives for NISTARS. NSC Oakland's
rationale for selecting the "two-phased procurement with a
delayed submission of pricing" was presented.
B. LESSONS LEARNED
Originally, when this case study analysis was undertaken,
a contract for NISTARS was programmed to be awarded in April
1980. If the project had remained on schedule, then this
researcher would have had the opportunity to contrast the
Government's anticipated or desired acquisition strategy re-
sult with that which was actually attained. Presently, the
NISTARS contract is projected to be awarded at the end of
calendar year 1980. Accordingly, the window from which this
researcher can infer and articulate lessons learned has been
abbreviated. Even with this constraint, the following en-
lightenment resulted from the analysis of NSC Oakland's efforts
to acquire NISTARS.
Lesson #1 - Don't assume that the provisions of Government
contracting are widely understood or accepted .
This insight resulted from a reading of the minutes of the
NISTARS pre-solicitation conference. During the conference,
the NSC Oakland Director of Procurement had been somewhat dis-
concerted by the number of contractors who indicated that they
had either transacted business with the Government in only the
traditionally formally advertised manner, or who, because of
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a variety of reasons including aversion to Government procure
ment mandate (e.g., socio-economic requirements) had little
desire to transact business with the Government. A general
intra- industry naivete or aversion to Government acquisition
could impair competition. NSC Oakland's response to this
situation was to attempt to effectively communicate and edu-
cate the industry as to the desires, methods and intents of
the Government regarding NISTARS. Potential contractors were
encouraged to communicate with the Government, as evidenced
by the RFP where contractors were invited to suggest and jus-
tify various contractual formats and acquisition alternatives
suitable for NISTARS.
Lesson #2 - The concept of a single, designated program
manager has significant merit and applicability for a project
similar to NISTARS .
When interviewed, one key member of the NISTARS acquisi-
tion team expressed the opinion that the project had suffered
from the lack of a single voice. The existing structure of
having the technical and acquisition responsibilities vested
in two different project officers was characterized as being
effectual when a problem or question relating directly to
either of these areas surfaced and for which guidance was
solicited. However, it was alleged that when a situation
arose which was not specifically in the province of one of
the two project officers, guidance was more difficult to
obtain. Under a program manager, a single person is in
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charge who can assign responsibility, orchestrate key task
completion and be a focal point for policy and guidance.
Lesson #3 - A NISTARS bulletin which discusses budget
information, policy and project progress should have been
published and distributed by the project office to the
selected NISTARS implementation sites .
One key individual associated with the NISTARS acquisi-
tion noted intermittent disconnects in the distribution of
project information to the three NISTARS sites (e.g., several
amendments to the RFP were not received by all sites). The
SSEB was comprised of individuals from each site; accordingly
there were occasions when the board met and their initial
actions were to normalize each person's knowledge of the cur-
rent NISTARS situation. Potential benefits of the bulletin
would be a currency of knowledge for all personnel associated
with the project and enhanced inter-site harmony.
Lesson #4 - A better strategy to acquire NISTARS may have
been to break out various parts of the system rather than
strive for a single systems contractor .
An interesting and relevant background fact that emerged
after the technical proposal submission deadline passed was
that the largest and generally acclaimed best company that
fields automated warehousing inventory control systems chose
not to bid on the NISTARS contract. When this firm was
queried by NSC Oakland as to why they chose not to compete,
they allegedly remarked that the NISTARS scope was so broad
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that all of their programmers would be required to work on
just that project and they did not want the company's resources
and financial future linked to one Government contract. If
the biggest and best company in the industry was adverse to
seeking the NISTARS award, then perhaps it might have been
more reasonable to consider acquiring the software, hardware
and integration service from the firms that specialize in
these functional areas rather than trying to acquire all three
from one contractor.
C. CONCLUSIONS
Conclusion #1 - NSC Oakland's acquisition strategy goal
to promote and attain competition was satisfied .
Three offerors submitted technical proposals. One of
these contractors was found to be unacceptable by the source
selection evaluation process. Given that there are few com-
panies who could perform or who would actively seek the
NISTARS contract, it is the opinion of this researcher that
the effort to obtain competition was successful.
Conclusion #2 - Project competition was promoted by
effective communication of the NISTARS source selection cri -
teria at the pre-solicitation conference .
The fact that the Director of Purchasing explained how
and why the Government established the envisioned contractual
incentives (e.g,, FPI share ratios and the 1% cancellation
ceiling) positively conveyed to the conference participants
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the Government's flexibility, objectivity and fair and
reasonable approach, to risk.
Conclusion #3 - The NISTARS acquisition strategy was
reasonably and expeditiously adjusted to address a problem-
atic interpretation of the provisions of the Davis-Bacon Act .
One measure of the proficiency of an acquisition team is
to note how and if they react to an unanticipated potentially
adverse situation. The magnitude and ultimate impact of the
Davis-Bacon Act was unforeseen by the NSC Oakland acquisition
team. However, once the issue surfaced, the DB related actions
taken by the PCO to avoid the appearance of being arbitrary,
to promulgate a uniform labor provision pricing baseline and
to attempt to minimize the opportunity for disruptive con-
tractor protests or Department of Labor intervention, are
viewed by this researcher as being responsive and effective.
Conclusion #4 - Simulation modeling was eliminated from
being incorporated into the NISTARS acquisition strategy be-
cause of a perceived lack of time for its development . Given
that the project schedule has slipped, this mechanism could
have been used .
The potential project gain resulting from having the
capability to perform a NISTARS performance specification
feasibility analysis coupled with the opportunity to more
objectively evaluate offerors' technical proposals trades-




Conclusion #5 - The Life Cycle Costing technique might
have been applied to NISTARS .
LCC could have heen a viable aspect of the acquisition
strategy; however, required personnel and monetary resources
in addition to the difficulty in attributing direct potential
benefits to NISTARS precluded LCC from being considered. The
current schedule delay places the possibility of having incor-
porated LCC in a more favorable light. The concept was given
inadequate attention in the early acquisition planning.
Conclusion #6 - NISTARS can be effectively awarded by
either a CPIF or a FPI contract .
As was discussed in Chapter III, the NISTARS project is
comprised of a variety of diverse risk components. The per-
formance cost and schedule risk factors are potentially per-
sonified by virtue of the turbulent national economic
environment in which the system is to be acquired. The FPI
and CPIF contract each can be structured so as to equitably
share the project's risk in addition to providing incentives
which will induce and reward high level performance.
Conclusion #7 - The strategic option of contracting for
a design specification package has significant merit and
applicability for a project like NISTARS .
One of the reasons that was previously cited for using
performance specifications was that they can promote competi-
tion. If design specifications can be obtained, then the same
result of facilitating competition can also be attained
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because the Government is afforded the opportunity to pursue
the following;
(1) The system could be acquired via the formally
advertised medium (including two step formal
advertising)
.
(2) The Government could split the system into integral
functions and then make several awards.
(3) Government furnished equipment (GFE) could be
acquired and provided to a software developer and
system integrater.
Conclusion #8 - The fragmented technical, business,
financial and contractual management of NISTARS vice having
a single, central program management authority, has served to
reduce the number of acquisition strategies which could be
adequately explored and addressed and has contributed to the
delay of a timely execution of the acquisition strategy
finally selected.
Research has established that of the acquisition strate-
gies that were considered, most were rejected. The researcher
has identified several other strategies and concepts which
could have been pursued if adequate planning and lead time
had been provided, for example, life cycle costing and model
simulation.
Conclusion #9 - The use of formal source selection cri-
teria positively contributed to the NISTARS acquisition.
It is the opinion of this researcher that the following
benefits resulted from the use of formal source selection
criteria. The NISTARS award will be made as a result of a
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particularly objective evaluation mechanism. Accordingly,
the source selection should be able to withstand intense
scrutiny. Additionally, the SSEB and SSAC were comprised of
individuals drawn from diverse geographical locations and
functional disciplines. These factors reinforce the sugges-
tion that the source selection will be fair and reasonable
in addition to the fact that the functional experts can make
a significant contribution toward selecting the best proposal.
The process of establishing a plan resulted in a much wider
participation by diverse functional disciplines than might
otherwise have occurred. This researcher believes that this
broadening aspect tended to involve more experienced personnel
than if NSC Oakland had been relied upon entirely for the
necessary personnel assets.
Conclusion #10 - The two-phased submission of the pricing
and technical proposals enhanced the NISTARS source selection
process .
Requiring the initial submission of technical proposals
and a delayed input of the pricing data resulted in a number
of desirable benefits. First, aspiring contractors were able
to spend all their time and resources initially developing
technical proposals. The offeror who was found technically
unacceptable was eliminated from consideration before being
subjected to the task of formulating a price proposal. Second,
Government resources were not ineffectually used to evaluate
or audit initial price proposals which are subject to change.
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Third, the opportunity for information leaks during technical
evaluation was eliminated with the delayed pricing submission.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation #1 - Assign a Project Manager for NISTARS .
A strong, central authority will draw together all elements
of the project into an integrated project organization which
will be better able to respond on a systematic basis to tech-
nical, financial and contractual problems. It is suggested
that this PM should report directly to the Commander, Naval
Supply Systems Command.
Recommendation #2 - For future projects which are similar
in scope to NISTARS, establish a separate dedicated project
office management structure.
The potential benefits of this organizational structure
are: (1) the project responsibility would be clearly estab-
lished and focused upon one person, (2) guidance, policy and
general communication would be easier to disseminate, and
(3) the project could be staffed with individuals who were
totally dedicated to the project because they would be in-
sulated from ancillary responsibilities and tasking. The
project office management concept could be executed in an
easy fashion (e»g«.> if NAVSUP had approved the concept of an
explicit project office for NISTARS, then a charter could




Recommendation #3 - Future projects of a magnitude similar
in scope to NISTARS should be allowed sufficient acquisition
planning time.
The allocation of a reasonable amount of planning time may
preclude having to eliminate potential viable acquisition al-
ternatives because of a lack of time to analyze their merit.
Recommendation #4 - It is suggested that the Project
Office institute a NISTARS bulletin.
The manpower and fiscal expenditures that would be associ-
ated with such an action are minimal when contrasted with the
potential benefits of currency of knowledge and inter-imple-
mentation site harmony. The bulletin could be distributed
from the project office on a periodic basis and its contents
could include a general project situation report in addition
to highlighting any special or anticipated occurrences. This
recommendation is extended to any future projects which may
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Program Manager: COMNAVSUPSYSCOM (SUP 032)
Description of Program: An integrated, process controlled
warehousing system for the receipt, storage, retrieval,
consolidation, packing and tracking of bin, rack and bulk
materials. The warehousing systems will be located at the





COMNAVSUPSYSCOM CSUP 32) Date
Distribution:
CNM (MAT 02) C10 copies)
COMNAVSUPSYSCOM (10 copies)
NSC Oakland (5 copies)
NSC Norfolk (.2 copies)





Naval Integrated Storage Tracking and Retrieval System (NISTARS)
is a complete system for controlling all material handled at
Naval Supply Center storage facilities. A basic criteria for
the system is that it will be universally applicable. Only
the mechanized material handling portion of the system will
need to be modified to accommodate the differences in facility
configurations
.
NISTARS will provide detailed, step-by-step process controlled
and cost effective mechanization for all warehouse distribution
functions, including receiving, storing, issuing, consolidation
and parcel post shipping. It will provide the information
necessary to assist the shipping facilities to consolidate and
optimize the transportation system. In addition, NISTARS will
control the necessary warehouse service functions of inventory,
rewarehousing, stock number changes, condition code changes,
shelf- life management and associated UADPS inventory manage-
ment procedures.
To accomplish the required performance, NISTARS utilizes a
dedicated process controller with intelligent remote termin-
als, micro-processor controlled material handling equipment
and associated storage aids. The intelligent remote termin-
als will be located strategically throughout the warehouse
complex to provide detailed operator instructions necessary
for all warehouse processing. As this processing is accom-
plished, NISTARS instantly updates the system records to pro-
vide real-time information and control.
NISTARS features the ability to integrate random emergency
requests for material immediately into the pending routine
workload; to immediately compensate whenever any variation in
the actual situation deviates from planned or estimated work
flow; and to print the issue documents and shipping labels at





All funding for this program and for contracts awarded there-
under will be by 0P,N funding.
Site Cost (in millions)
FY 8 FY 81
NSC Oakland (omitted - contract
NSC Norfolk sensitive data)
NSC San Diego
The cost estimates were formulated utilizing data obtained
from WICS, DISARS and ASKARS. The three sites were then
costed based on known transaction volumes and projected work-
load increases associated with SER V. Norfolk and San Diego
costs were increased by the inflation index as they are to





NISTARS is required to effect the productivity gains and
economics of operation attendant by the SER study report.
In order to meet the commitments in the SER study report,
the contract for NISTARS must be awarded by 15 April 1980.
The contractor must be notified of the availability of funds
for the second program year by 15 October 1980.
Listed below is the delivery schedule for the three systems:
Site System Ready to Load Acceptance Test
NSC Oakland 18 months ADC (15 Oct 81) 24 months ADC (15 Apr 82)
NSC Norfolk 26 months ADC (15 Jun 82) 32 months ADC (15 Dec 82)




4.0 DECISION COORDINATING PAPER (DCP) OR PROGRAM
MEMORANDUM, DEFENSE SYSTEM ACQUISITION REVIEW





5.0 BACKGROUND AND PROCUREMENT HISTORY
5.1 WICS
The technology for a warehouse process control system was
developed under the Warehouse Information Control System (WICS)
procured for Warner Robins Air Force Base. The contract was
negotiated under 1OUS2304 Ca) (10) as implemented by paragraph
3- 210. 2 (xiii) of the DAR since it was determined that offerers
might take exception to and/or that there would be a need to
negotiate areas of the performance specification. Three
offerers responded: Clay Bernard Systems International (CBSI)
,
Raymond Mobility Systems, Inc., and Otis Elevator Co. The
award of a firm-fixed-price contract was made to the low
offerer, CBSI. Technical proposals were not solicited.
The contract was issued in April 1975, conditional approval
was granted on 28 October 1977 and final acceptance took place
on 5 May 1978. The contract negotiator stated that 18 months
would have been a realistic delivery, however, the actual
three year delivery resulted from construction delays, the
death of a key programmer, specification changes and produc-
tion problems. The final acceptance was based on a simulated
test, but in fact, the system has failed to produce the tested
5000 throughput under real conditions. The system is currently
handling 1800 transactions per day. The WICS has failed to
meet the designed throughput requirements for several reasons:
a. limitations of the Data General Process controller,
b. electromagnetic interference of the wire guided
vehicles
,
c. insufficient loading of the system,
d. motivation of personnel.
Forty-two modifications have been issued to date resulting in
an increase of $1,866,049 from $4,627,918 to $6,493,967. The
price increases were due to the exercise of an option, the
addition of work the Government was originally scheduled to
perform, and engineering changes.
A failure to initially identify data requirements resulted in






The technology was expanded under the Depot Integrated Storage
and Retrieval System (DISARS) procured by DCSC for the Defense
General Supply Center, Richmond, Virginia. The acquisition
was started as a two-step, formally advertised, firm-fixed-
price procurement. Out of 44 firms solicited under step I,
two firms responded: Clay Bernard Systems International and
MB Associates. Both technical proposals were determined
acceptable, and, consequently, both firms were solicited under
step II. Prior to the opening of the second step, MB Associ-
ates advised DCSC that they would not submit a bid because of
the financial risk involved. The IFB was changed by amendment
to an RFP and negotiations were conducted with the single
offerer CBSI.
The contract was issued on 10 July 1978. After six months
there have been no modifications to the contract. CBSI has
proposed several changes, but these have been rejected by the
Government. There was a slight delay caused by the Government
on the software programs; however, the project manager expects
the system will come in on schedule.





The Automated Storage Kitting and Retrieval System (ASKARS)
is a related process-controlled system bought by NRPO Long
Beach for four NARF sites. This proposal was also begun as
a two-step formal and, after receipt of only one technical
proposal (from CBSI) was converted to a negotiated procurement.
The first system was scheduled for delivery on 20 January 1979
but a delay of approximately one month is expected owing to
delays caused by the MHE subcontractor. Approximately $100,000
worth of increases over the original contract are attributable
to engineering/design changes. The data bought with ASKARS
is not applicable.
5.4 CONCLUSIONS AND ACQUISITION STRATEGY
5.4.1 The Naval Integrated Storage, Tracking and Retrieval
Systems (NISTARS) is the next logical step in automated ware-
housing technology. WICS, DISARS, and ASKARS are process-




handling device and configured to meet a specific warehousing
application. NISTARS, in comparison, will provide process
control for all general purpose warehousing functions and be
capable of controlling multiple types of material handling
equipment, both automated and manual. In addition, it will
be capable of supporting remote supply facilities. The pro-
cess control software for the other systems cannot control
all of these functions.
Utilizing past procurement history the NISTARS procurement has
been designed to attract competition and at the same time be
aware of the possibility and attendant risk of sole-source
negotiations
.
Several specific procurement approaches have been proposed in
order to generate competition. Several of these approaches
are discussed in more detail in later sections, however, they
are synopsized below to give an overview of the efforts to
make the procurement competitive:
a. Performance Specification : Both ASKARS and DISARS
used a detailed design specification with performance
parameters. Since DOD's primary knowledge of integrated
process-controlled warehouse systems comes from WICS,
DISARS and ASKARS, a detailed design specification would
be built on these predecessor systems and would be likely
to favor CBSI. By using a performance specification,
firms will be able to propose a system design consistent
with their own hardware and software capabilities.
b. Multiple site : The development cost of an inte-
grate^ process -controlled warehousing system is sub-
stantial and in order to remain competitive, a firm
would need a large base over which to distribute the
costs. The three-site approach provides a substantial
base for allocation of direct and/or indirect costs.
In addition, the multiple site approach takes advantage
of the extracontractual incentive of the potential for
future business. The Navy's commitment to develop
NISTARS at the three Supply Centers implies a commitment
to the concept of integrated, process-controlled ware-
housing and, consequently, a potential for follow-on
contracts
.
c. Multi-year : Since CBSI has developed similar systems
they are in a position to underbid their competitors be-
cause they have already recouped some of the development




assurance to firms just entering the field that they
will be able to recoup unamortized start-up costs with
a cancellation ceiling should the government not elect
to procure all three systems.
In addition, since the government has to commit the
costs of a cancellation ceiling and since fund avail-
ability is the only determinant in proceeding with the
additional program year, industry perceives the multi-
year contract as a firmer commitment to procure all
three systems.
d. Fixed-Price Incentive : The predecessor systems have
been bought on a FFP basis and it appears that cost risk
for this type contract has dissuaded firms from compet-
ing. The fixed-price- incentive type contract will reduce
the cost risk to the contractor since the government
will share overruns up to the point of total assumption.
e. Source Selection Plan : Several firms indicated that
they were discouraged from bidding on government contract
since proposals were always solicited under formal bid
procedures with award being made solely on the base of
price, without regard to the quality of the supplies
being purchased. Under the proposed negotiation pro-
cedures proposals will be evaluated on technical factors
in addition to price and the award will be made to the
firm whose proposal offers the greatest value to the
government from both performance and cost standpoints.
5.4.2 In addition to the above factors which directly impact
on competition, there are several other features of the pro-
curement plan developed from a review of past procurement
history:
a. Negotiation : Both DISARS and ASKARS were begun on
a 2- step formal bid basis and had to be converted to
negotiated solicitations when competition failed to
materialize. Clay Bernard Systems International was
effectively put on notice that they were the sole
offeror and, in the minds of the respective negotiators,
became more intransigent during negotiation.
Since procurement history, contract type, and source
selection method preclude the use of a formally adver-
tised solicitation, the contract will be negotiated
with a delayed submission of pricing proposals.
b. Turnkey System : WICS, ASKARS and DISARS have all




software and hardware package. One firm has suggested
that if the system were broken out into separate hard-
ware and software packages with the Navy acting as
systems integrator more competition would result. The
primary objection to this suggestion is that the tech-
nical risks for the government would be increased
enormously. In the case of a turnkey system the Navy
would accept a fully functioning system that meets
specific performance parameters. In the case of separate
contracts, if the system fails the tests, there is likely
to be a lengthy battle over whether the hardware con-
tractor, software contractor, or the Navy as integrator
is responsible for the failure.
In addition, there is substantial doubt as to whether
more competition would be generated particularly in the
large risk area- -software . As stated above, without the
large base over which to distribute development costs
it is unlikely that a new firm would be interested in
bidding.
5.4.3 To allow industry input on the specifications, a pre-
solicitation conference was held on 31 January 1979. A notice
of the presolicitation conference was published in the Commerce
Business Daily on 22 January 1979 and individual letters to
prospective offerors were sent on 12 January 1979. The list
of 28 firms who received the individual notices was made up
from sources supplied by (1) the NISTARS project office, (2)
the WIC, ASKARS and DISARS negotiators, and (3) the Thomas
Register. Twenty-six firms attended the presolicitation con-
ference: ten in response to the individual notices and sixteen
in response to the CBD announcement.
The agenda for the conference included a brief overview of
NISTARS, an overview of the proposed procurement plan, dis-
tribution of the proposed specification, and a discussion of
both the procurement plan and the specification. At that time
there were very few specific comments on the specifications
except for a criticism that the controller portion of the
specification was too restrictive. The discussion of the
procurement plan indicated a definite lack of knowledge of
government contracting; a number of the firms apparently either
had never done business with the government or only had done
business on a firm-fixed price, formally-advertised basis.
Prospective contractors were requested to submit written com-
ments to the contract negotiator. Three firms forwarded
detailed comments on the specifications; and one among those




of contract would be more appropriate. A fourth firm, Jervis
B. Webb Company, submitted lengthy comments on the proposed
procurement plan.
5.4.4 COMPETITION
From preliminary indications, it appears that NISTARS will be
a competitive procurement.
The three firms forwarding detailed specification comments have
subsequently asked questions which indicate they are at least
making preliminary studies preparatory to bidding. Addition-
ally, in a discussion between a potential subcontractor and
the contract negotiator, the contractor identified two other
firms (from among those attending the presolicitation confer-





NISTARS does not go beyond existing technology in either hard-
ware or software development. Although the Navy would encourage
a proposal that reflected a breakthrough in material handling
equipment design, offerors are expected to propose equipment
that is currently commercially available Cpossibly with minor
modifications). To a large extent the same hypothesis is true
in the software area. "Ready-made" software programs are not
available, however, the software programs envisioned are well
within the current capability of the software industry. Nor
is the marriage of the software and MHE industry new. In
addition to the DOD applications cited in paragraph 5, industry
has for some time employed various forms of integrated, process-
controlled warehouse operations. NISTARS does go beyond exist-
ing commercial and military systems in the areas of throughput
and the number and complexity of items received and issued.
The WICS requirement was 5000 transactions per eight hour day,
DISARS was 8000 and NISTARS is 18,000. A more detailed com-
parison of DISARS and NISTARS is shown below:
*UPGRADED *UPGRADED
Per 8 hr day DISARS DISARS NISTARS NISTARS
issues 7,200 15,000 25,000
receipts 800 3,000 5,000
Peak load per hr
issues
receipts
*Under the initial procurement the contractors software must
be capable of expansion to accommodate the increased number
of transactions. However, in order to process the larger num-
ber of transactions a separate, parallel set of material
handling equipment would have to be procured and installed.
The final decision to expand the system will be based on work-
load requirements.
The throughput figures alone do not explain the extent of the
risks. Obviously a system which processed a small number of
items in large batches could easily meet the throughput re-
quirements. In general the existing commercial systems with
high throughput requirements are designed to receive and
issue a limited range of items stored in limited number of
locations and picked in large batches. By contrast, both
DISARS and NISTARS are designed to control a much wider range
of items and number of locations and are designed for indi-
vidual picks.
91
990 2,340 2,500 4,200
110 260 650 1,000

APPENDIX A (Continued)
DISARS N I STARS
Number of NSN's 750,000 1,500,000
Number of Locations 2,000,000 3,600,000
Another feature which distinguishes NISTARS from its commer-
cial counterparts is the number of interfaces required (i.e.,
UDAPS, NAVADS, etc.). The interfaces combined with the
required management control and information systems form a
complex data package which exceeds the software requirements
of commercial systems. Thus, the NISTARS requirements present
an interesting dichotomy: The data requirements are well
within the capability of the software industry but exceed the
normal data capability of the material handling industry.
The answer to this problem is found in the firms expected to
respond to the solicitation. All three firms who provided
detailed comments on the specification following the pre-
solicitation conference have strong software and systems in-
tegration backgrounds with more limited material handling
equipment (MHE) manufacturing expertise.
This type of contractor is also logical considering the MHE
requirements. The predecessor systems all used a single type
of equipment: WICS and DISARS, wire guided order picking
vehicle; ASKARS, automatic mini-load retreiver (stackers).
In order to produce the required NISTARS throughput it is
anticipated that the offerors will have to use a variety of
equipment, potentially including carousels, mini- stackers
,
mobile order-picking vehicles and packing sortation equipment.
There is no known individual firm which can supply that diverse
an equipment list. Thus the contractor will have to subcon-
tract at least a portion of the MHE and integrate it into the
total system.
6.1 TECHNICAL RISK
As indicated above in the discussion of the WICS system, the
major technical risk is that the system will fail to achieve
the required throughput. The following analysis of the WICS
system together with statements of the corrective and prevent-
ative measures employed in NISTARS indicate that similar
problems should not occur:
a. The Data General Process Controller used on WICS
is core limited and cannot be expanded. Additionally,
it cannot be operated in parallel with, a second CPU and
obtain realistic dual processing capability. This core
expansion is necessary in order to achieve the required
response times. NISTARS specifications are more demand-




b. The order picking vehicles communicate with the
process controller utilizing the wire guidance line.
The data transmissions are being garbled because of
electromagnetic impulses in the line which cause the
process controller to shut down. NISTARS will require
alternative communication methodologies if order pick-
ing vehicles are proposed (other than through the wire
guide)
.
c. The WICS is only approximately 30% loaded. This
causes excessive travel time between picks with the
resultant loss of productivity. NISTARS will load the
system for six months before the acceptance test and
then process all new eligible receipts in the automated
warehouse: thus NISTARS will be tested (and will operate)
with a fully loaded system.
d. The WICS system was tested using computer technician
type personnel. It has subsequently functioned with
regular warehouse people, many of whom do not have an
aptitude for the computerized system. In addition, DLA
has not established productivity standards for the ware-
house people and, although one woman processes 500 trans-
actions per day, the average is slightly less than 200.
By contrast, at NSC Oakland a position description has
already been established for warehousing-data entry.
The creation of a separate PD has the advantages of (1)
allowing for aptitude testing of applicants, and (2)
attracting the best people through promotion. Also, a
management control system will be supplied as part of
the software and this will give management the tools to
monitor and control productivity on an individual level.
Additionally, NISTARS shares with WICS, ASKARS and DISARS the
use of turnkey concept with the contractor responsible for the
design, material, software, integration and installation. The
contractor is responsible for delivering a fully functioning
system, thus, the risk to the government is substantially less
than if the Navy were responsible for the design and system
integration. The problem with WICS was not with the turnkey
concept, but rather with acceptance based on simulation using
an ideal situation. By contrast, NISTARS will be tested on
an actual operational basis.
The use of a performance specification as opposed to a design
specification is also a means of reducing the risk to the
government. The performance specification shifts the design






Originally NISTARS was planned for three different geographic
areas- -NSC Oakland/NAS Alameda, NSC Norfolk/NAS Norfolk, and
NSC San Diego/NAS North Island- -with separate procurement
actions for each site. The cost for each system, based on
this procurement strategy, could result in repetitive costs
for program development if different contractors were supply-
ing the equipment/system at each site. This cost risk is
reduced through the proposed procurement strategy which would
result in one contractor for all three sites. In addition to
eliminating repetitive software development costs, the use of
single contractor will permit quantity discount savings.
As indicated by the prior procurement, with a new system there
is a potential for cost increases as a result of system improve
ments.
There are several cost risks associated with multi-year con-
tracting :
a. if funding for the second program year is not avail-
able, the cost of the cancellation ceiling will have to
be absorbed; and
b. under the accompanying price adjustment provisions,
labor and material increases are possible.
The last risk should be offset to a certain degree by the use
of multi-year contracts which will encourage contractors to
place advance orders or option orders for the material hand-
ling equipment, thus taking advantage of quantity trade
discounts and reducing the increases resulting from inflation.
Since it is expected that the material handling equipment will
constitute approximately 751 of the cost of the system, the
savings would be significant.
6.3 SCHEDULE RISK
A slip in any major milestone will result in increasing the
risk of meeting the planned award date and subsequent slippage
in the planned operational dates. If these deadlines are not
met the planned implementation dates for NISTARS will be de-
layed which will result in postponement of projected manpower
savings associated with implementation of these systems. Thus
the contract will include liquidated damages provision based
on a projected daily cost savings of over $3,000.
Based on the procurement history the schedule risk is increased




is likely to encounter at least some of the problems that





7.Q INTEGRATED LOGISTICS SUPPORT PLANNING CONCEPT
The system that will be installed to the performance specifi-
cations will he an integration of standard, off-the-shelf
material handling equipment components and commercially avail-
able process control equipment. Technical proposals, in order
to be considered responsive, will contain information regard-
ing the maintenance concept, corrective and preventive main-
tenance requirements, skill level requirements of maintenance
and operational personnel, maintenance data package (including
drawings) , repair and maintenance part requirements and test
equipment requirements. In addition, the prospective con-
tractor will be required to spell out the components of the
system which are not off-the-shelf and a proposed spare parts/
sub-components plan needed to maintain these components.
Hardware and software maintenance will be provided by the
contractor for one year after acceptance at each site. During
this period the contractor will train Navy personnel in the
maintenance of both the hardware and software. For a discus-




8. DESIGN TO COST
Not applicable.





1Q.0 RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY
Reliability of the process controllers is specified as 100%.
By this requirement the process controllers and the associated
supporting equipment shall be designed so that there is not
only redundancy of equipment but also redundancy of communica-
tions links between the various systems components. With this
system configuration it is considered the reliability require-
ments will be accomplished. Any technical proposal that does
not offer to meet the system reliability requirements will not
be favorably considered. System components shall be tested a
minimum of 1000 hours, with no more than three failures per-
mitted, to ensure the required degree of reliability. Addi-
tionally, the system software shall be Mburned-in M a minimum
of 1000 hours with no more than five failures.
System components are specified to be of modular design to
simplify the maintenance effort. The system remote terminals
will be designed to accept and retain instructions on all
required warehousing functions from the primary warehouse pro-
cess controller. This feature of the system design will pro-
vide a backup capability by either interchanging equipment or
functional assignment. Interchange will be done on a priori-
tized basis dependent upon the functional requirements at the
time equipment substitution is necessary.
A proposed quantity of spare electronic control devices for
each subsystem shall be provided. They shall include the full
spectrum of electronics for each work station and shall include,
but not be limited to all housings, power supplies, printers,
printed circuit boards, consoles, keyboards, badge reader, and
communication devices.
The above shall be complete in all respects and be able to
fully replace the electronic package as a composite for any
work station in the system. The units shall be designed to
allow removal and replacement of a defective package as a
whole. In addition, the units shall be of such design as to
be fully repaired as a unit in the maintenance repair area





11.0 TEST AND EVALUATION APPROACH
The system is being procured and installed under a performance
specification with the contractor being responsible for meet-
ing the throughput requirements set forth in section 6.0.
The procurement history provides "lessons learned" in the test
and evaluation approach. The WICS was accepted based on a
test which was run using dummy material (empty boxes) , con-
tractor personnel operation of much of the system and with
contractor personnel involved in the initial loading of the
system. The system has been unable to duplicate the "simulated 1
5000 transaction throughput under actual operating conditions.
NISTARS provides that the system will be loaded with actual
cargo by Navy operators for six (6) months prior to conducting
the acceptance testing. The test will then be conducted
utilizing Navy personnel with actual transactions in order to




12.0 MANAGEMENT INFORMATION/ PROGRAM CONTROL REQUIREMENTS
Progress reports will be submitted by the contractor to
COMNAVSUPSYSCOM (Code 032N) , the PCO and the ACO every thirty
(30) days. The progress reports shall include, as a minimum,
the following:
a. Project Summary--a report consisting of from one to
three pages that will, in a short form, describe the status
of the project as a whole, particularly highlighting all
problems that may exist or if there are any potential delays.
b. Milestone Update--a detailed milestone plan shall be
provided with updates which shall cover, as a minimum, the
following areas:
(1) Production Schedule for all in-plant production.
(2) Software Schedule to cover the design, coding,
testing, debugging and on-site installation of all software
associated with the project.
(3) Installation Schedule to cover the installation
of all equipment and components of the system. Additionally,
it shall include milestones covering the acquisition and
installation of any transmission lines external to the desig-
nated NISTARS buildings.
The ACO will provide the PCO with comments concerning each
progress report relative to the correctness of the information
provided.
The Government will assign a full-time on-site contracting
officer's representative at each of the three installations.
The contractor shall name a full-time NISTARS project manager





13.0 APPROVAL FOR OPERATIONAL USE
Not applicable.
14.0 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED MATERIAL/FACILITIES/COMPONENT
BREAKOUT
The only Government furnished facilities are the buildings
where the systems will be installed at each site and the
associated utilities.
15.0 APPLICATION OF SHOULD COSTS
Not applicable.
16.0 MILESTONE CHART
See Attachment A. (Insert omitted in thesis.)
17.0 MILESTONES FOR UPDATING THE PROCUREMENT PLAN
The procurement plan will be updated whenever changes that
materially affect the method of procurement and/or objective
of the plan occur.
18.0 PARTICIPANTS IN PROCUREMENT PLAN PREPARATION
The following personnel assisted in the preparation of this
procurement plan:
Mr. T. L. M. Wiegant Ms. J. Weaver
Commander D. M. Chism Lieutenant Commander M. Kalapos
SC, USN SC, USN








19.1 Item Description - see paragraph 1.0.
19.2 Estimated Cost - see paragraph 2.0
19.3 Proposed sources and basis for selection.
As indicated in the synopsis of the acquisition strategy, the
procurement has been designed to attract maximum competition.
The bidders list used for the presolicitation conference will
be expanded by adding names from the list of attendees to
the 1979 Automated Material Handling and Storage System Con-
ference, and, the solicitation will be synopsized in the
Commerce Business Daily.
19.4 SOURCE SELECTION PROCEDURE
19.4.1 Formal Source Selection Plan
Although this program is not a designated major defense pro-
gram, the Source Selection Plan for the evaluation and selec-
tion of the contractor incorporates the objectives and policy
established by NAVMAT Instruction 4200.49 dated 28 February
1977.
19.4.2 Negotiations
NISTARS will be a negotiated procurement with a delayed sub-
mission of the pricing proposals. The pricing will be submitted
at a later time for the following reasons:
a. During the presolicitation conference the prospective
contractors stated that they would need the additional
time to prepare the price proposal. Also they indicated
that they didn't want to waste their resources develop-
ing initial cost data since (1) their proposal might be
determined to be unacceptable or {!) technical changes
might nullify the initial pricing.
b. The last argument is equally valid for the govern-
ment. Pricing information, if provided in the first
phase, would be useless. Because of the time required
for technical discussion, the initial prices could only
be used as gross estimates. In addition, it would be
too time consuming and unproductive for both the govern-
ment and the offerors to attempt to reconcile the initial
pricing and the final offers. It would be useless and





c. The delayed submission of pricing information reduces
the opportunity for information leaks. A discussion
overheard or a careless leak could jeopardize the entire
procurement. The government must be as careful about
appearances as occurrences; the delayed submission re-
duces the possibility that an offeror could think there
had been a leak.
Consideration was also given to using two-step formal adver-
tising, four-step negotiation, and conventional negotiations.
Two-step formal advertising was eliminated since formal bid
procedures are inconsistent with a fixed price incentive con-
tract and since the government has not been able to obtain
competition on recent similar procurements using the two-step
methos
.
The use of the four-step method was not considered desirable
since the restrictions in discussions would severely reduce
the opportunity for real competition. Although conventional
negotiation methods carry a danger of technical transfusion,
this danger is reduced by several factors. First, the general
concept is already well established in the market place. This
is not a research effort but rather a new application of exist-
ing technology. Thus, barring a major technological break-
through, no truly original approaches are anticipated. Second,
the technical evaluators are sufficiently knowledgeable to
provide comments and guidance to the various competitors with-
out reference to any one offeror's proposal. Third, and most
important, the problems of technical leveling and technical
transfusion can be resolved through careful conduct of the
negotiations. In addition, the four-step method is undesir-
able because it limits final discussions to a single offeror,
thus eliminating an important tool of negotiations, competition
Conventional negotiation method was considered since it would
provide an early indication that the proposals were within the
funding limitations. However, it appears potential offerors
are already aware of the funding limitations and will bid
accordingly. During discussions the firms have frequently
cited the 40 million dollars figure and one potential offeror
presented the contract negotiator with a copy of the FY 80
budget showing 12.7 million for NISTARS.
19.5 CONTRACT TYPE
It is anticipated that a Fixed Price Incentive (firm targets)
contract will be negotiated with incentives applied to both




Under NISTARS there is a firm performance requirement, a
reasonably high expectation of technical success and no need
for extensive technical direction by the Government. However,
for a firm entering the field, there is a substantial cost
risk in the development of the software package and system
integration. Past procurement history indicates that this
cost risk has been a factor which has limited competition.
It is hoped that by using a FPI contract type the cost risks
will be reduced and additional firms will submit proposals.
An FFP contract was also considered since the three previous
related contracts were negotiated on a FFP basis with CBSI.
However, the decision to use FPI was based on the inherent
system risk as opposed to the probable risk for a single con-
tractor. For a new contractor the integration process and
development of the software package represent substantial cost
risks. On the other hand, for CBSI, who has acted as a system
integrator and has developed similar software packages, the
cost risk is considerably reduced. In order to attract com-
petition, the procurement package must be oriented toward the
general condition and not the specific case of CBSI. However,
the final selection of contract type will be based on the logic
of the individual situation. Thus, during negotiations, the
cost data, offerors' experience, and technical risk will be
evaluated to determine the feasibility of negotiating a FFP
type contract.
In addition to cost, incentives will be applied to the schedule
on a liquidated damages basis. Since the primary motivation
for implementing the NISTARS concept is personnel savings, a
delay in implementation will postpone the personnel reductions
and prove very costly. Although obviously the cost savings
will vary depending on attrition, the loss caused by delay
averages approximately $3,000 per day.
Although early implementation would also equate to a manpower
savings a reward incentive will not be included for the follow-
ing reasons:
a. Generally the relationship between schedule incentive
and cost incentives would be inverse. Since the personnel
savings is an imprecise figure, it would be difficult to
assure that schedule savings would not be outweighed by
cost increases.
b. The Government will require almost six months after
installation to load the system. Thus, even if the con-





An incentive will not be applied to performance since the
specified throughput represents the upper range of performance
attainable by the contractor without a significant technologi-
cal breakthrough.. The upper range is limited by manual labor
standards for receipts, issues and packs. Without the devel-
opment of a completely new approach in material handling, the
required throughput cannot be substantially increased because
the warehouse personnel cannot receive, issue and pack any
faster.
19.6 NEGOTIATION AUTHORITY
The proposed contract will be negotiated under the authority
of 10 USC 2304(a) (10) as implemented by ASPR 3- 210. 2 (xiii)
,
since it is not possible to draft adequate design specifica-
tions. It is possible to describe the performance standards
but it is not feasible to describe the software package and
the interrelationship of hardware and software in sufficient
detail to permit advertising. In addition, the goal is to
obtain an optimum, not a minimum system. The negotiation
process will permit the evaluation of various methods and
approaches to the NISTARS system and thereby maximize compe-
tition and allow for trade-offs to secure an optimum system.
19.7 REPROCUREMENT DATA
Reprocurement data is not required for the material handling
equipment since the Government already has sufficient data to
reprocure these items on a competitive basis. The process
controller is a commercial item developed at private expense.
The essential element for reprocurement would be unrestricted
rights to the data for the software package. However, the
following factors should be weighed before the decision is
made to purchase the data with unrestricted rights:
a. Cost. Current estimates for unrestricted data
rights are three to four million dollars.
b. Need for reprocurement data. It is anticipated
that the NISTARS software package will provide a "uni-
versal shopping list" with potential applicability to
other Naval and DOD activities. However, this assumes
that the system will be configured around a variety of
types of MHE and that other activities will be able to
select applicable portions of the software package for
their own use. Should a new and/or really unique ap-
proach be offered the data might not be divisible into





Also it is obvious there is no need for the reprocure-
ment data unless there is a known requirement to expand
the NISTARS concept to other activities. The expansion
could take one of two forms: discrete automated material
handling systems or the integration of NISTARS sites with
each other and other inventory control and automated
material handling systems. In the former case it would
be possible to compete again on a total system basis.
However, in the latter case, restricted data rights
would compel the Government to negotiate on a sole-
source basis with the NISTARS contractor for integration
services
.
c. Usefulness of data. Even with unlimited data rights,
the question remains of the stand-alone value of the
software. The software package is only one element of
a sophisticated integrated system. The Government would
also require the expertise to maintain it and use it in
an integrated process-controlled operation. If that
expertise does not reside in the Government or cannot
be developed economically the software's value is limited.
Since for the most part the above information will only
be available late in the procurement process, the deci-
sion to buy an unrestricted software data package must
be deferred until all the information can be analyzed.
To facilitate the purchase of the data rights, if that
is the final decision, the predetermination of-rights-
in-technical-data procedure will be followed.
19.8 OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
19.8.1 Small Business, Labor Surplus Area Concerns,
Minority Business
The Small Business Specialist will be consulted in establish-
ing the bidders list. However, based on past procurement
history there is no expectation of receiving a sufficient num-
ber of offerors from small business or labor surplus area con-
cerns to warrant a set-aside. The size of the procurement and
financial risk involved preclude consideration under the 8(a)
program.
19.8.2 Synopsis
Although the length of the bid list precludes listing the firms
in the Commerce Business Daily, the procurement will be synop-






As indicated above, it is anticipated that the procurement
will he awarded on a multi-year basis. Multi-year shares with
the option concept the advantages of standardization, reduced
costs and increased competition, however, multi-year more
effectively promotes these goals.
Because of the high cost involved in the development of the
software package and because only one contractor is known to
have developed a related package, the competitive base is
severely limited. By allowing firms to amortize the software
development costs over three systems, their prices should be
more competitive. Under a contract with options for the sec-
ond and third sites, the contractors would either have to
"front load" these costs or gamble that the Government would
exercise the options.
It is possible that the savings would be greater under a multi-
year since it is a common practice in industry to allow the
same or similar trade discounts if the only contingency for
the additional quantities is the availability of funds. This
is an example of industry's perception that multi-year pro-
curement is a more firm commitment to procure all three systems
Under a contract with options, a number of factors in addition
to funds availability may dictate whether or not the options
are exercised.
The one obstacle to use of the multi-year procedure is the DAR
requirement for identical unit prices. In accordance with DAR
1-322
. 2 (c) (.iv) , "the unit price of each item in the multi-year
requirement shall be the same for all program years." Al-
though the three NISTARS installations are essentially equal,
differences in building configurations dictate different
material handling equipment and, thus, probably different
prices. To require the contractors to apply the identical
unit-price concept would mean a distortion of the actual
prices. The distortion would make it difficult to negotiate
any changes to the contract or to settle any termination claim.
On the other hand, it is possible to follow the basic concept
of multi-year and amortize the non-recurring costs over the
three sites. Therefore, in order to obtain the benefits of
a multi-year procedure while providing for a logical price
structure, a request for a waiver of DAR 1-322. 2(c) (iv) will
be submitted. The cancellation ceiling will not exceed the




19.9 ALTERNATIVE PROCUREMENT APPROACHES CONSIDERED
Since Clay Bernard Systems International is the only known
firm who has developed a similar system, consideration was
given to various forms of sole-source procurements with CBSI:
a. A sole-source procurement for three turnkey systems;
and
b. A competitive hardware procurement and a sole-source
procurement of software and integration services from
CBSI.
The first alternative was rejected since there is no justifi-
cation for buying the MHE from CBSI. CBSI has only a limited
manufacturing capability and on prior procurements has sub-
contracted for the material handling equipment and process
controllers. These hardware items are standard commercial
items for which there is a competitive market. Since these
costs constitute 60 to 751 of the system costs and since
there is sufficient data available to procure them competi-
tively, even if some type of sole-source procurement were
warranted, it would be reasonable to break out the hardware
items.
The second alternative would have required substantially more
in-house resources and would have increased the program risk.
However, the primary reason that the alternative was rejected
was because the sole-source rationale was weak. Although
CBSI has been prominant in the development of integrated
process controlled warehousing systems, and has ultimately
been the only offeror on two of the three prior procurements,
the knowledge and technology is available to other firms.
However, these other firms must be willing to assume cost
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Subj : Integrated Warehousing Systems at Naval Supply Centers
Encl: (1) Integrated Warehousing Systems Group (IWSG),
SUP 032N, Charter and Staffing
(2) Integrated Warehousing Systems Organizational
Relationships
1. Purpose . To establish the organizational structure and
resource capability to plan for and implement state-of-the-
art, process controlled material management systems and
complementary automated materials handling systems at the
Naval Supply Centers.
2. Background . During the past two years increased emphasis
has been placed on the study of warehouse automation and mech-
anization as a means of continuing responsive supply support
in the face of dwindling resources. Interest and study of
available systems were intensified in late 1977 as state-of-
the-art warehouse mechanization installed by the Air Force
and planned by the Defense Logistics Agency were reviewed.
As a result a decision was made to proceed with developmental
plans for these type systems for installation at NAVSUP stock
points. In order to properly manage this major undertaking,
it is necessary to establish a special Headquarters group and
project team to plan, develop, coordinate, and implement the
Integrated Warehousing Systems Project at Naval Supply Centers
in the 1980-1981 time frame.
3. Objective . To provide a modern, state-of-the-art, process-
controlled material management system and a complementary
automated materials handling system that is responsive to the
support requirements of the Navy. This integrated warehousing
system will provide total warehouse control of all material
stored in both the mechanized and non-mechanized storage
areas. Control over receiving, storage, issuing, packing,
and related service functions such as stock maintenance actions,
inventory, work scheduling, and reporting will be required by
this integrated warehousing system. The automated materials
handling system will utilize a variety of equipment, i.e.,






automated equipment, to receive, store, package and transport
materials. Major considerations that must be satisfied within
this objective are:
a. To identify future NSC peacetime and mobilization
operational support and wholesale depot requirements for auto-
mated materials handling systems.
b. To identify future pressures which will govern the
environment and specify assumptions.
c. To determine specifications against which contractors
will bid for the warehousing system.
d. To examine alternatives available to provide integrated
warehousing system.
e. To recommend selection of system appropriate for each
NSC.
f. To identify proper interface with existing and planned
UADPS-SP related systems improvements, such as:
(1) Assurance of complete interaction with the Navy
Automated Transportation Documentation System (NAVADS) project
to provide a close relationship between receiving, shipping,
storage, and transportation functions at the NSCs
.
g. To assure that implementation of the integrated ware-
housing system is effected in a timely manner, in conformance
with available MILCON and OPN funding.
h. To perform as the functional manager for integrated
warehousing systems and coordinate/interface with project
offices at NSCs for these type systems.
4. Project Organization . The following organization is
established effective 1 October 1978:
The Integrated Warehousing Systems Group (IWSG) , SUP
032N, in accordance with the staffing plan and charter of
enclosure (1)
•
5. Policy . The success of this project will depend heavily
on top management attention and support by selected NAVSUPSYSCOM
managed activities. Virtually all aspects of supply support
Navy-wide will be affected. The systems installed as a result







management capability to meet the supply support demands of
the future. It is therefore the policy of this Headquarters
that this effort be completely and fully supported. This
includes the cooperation and support of each of the partici-
pants to ensure an orderly, cost effective, transition from
the present to the future in an environment of minimum dis-
ruption to current support operations.
6. Action
a. Establish and staff the organizational entity set
forth herein on the date indicated.
b. Commence performance of assigned tasks to be completed
within designated time frames.
c. Monitor project task assignments, exchange information,
submit periodic project progress reports, and modify planning
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INTEGRATED WAREHOUSING SYSTEMS GROUP (IWSG) , SUP 032N
CHARTER AND STAFFING
1. Title . Integrated Warehousing Systems Group (IWSG), SUP
032N.
2. Task Description . The IWSG (SUP 032N) will be responsible
for coordinating Headquarters integrated warehousing system
planning, developing and implementing actions in support of
the project objectives. All requests for data, clarification
of guidance/policy or perspective in any given discipline will
be channeled via SUP 032N. SUP 032N will be responsible for
directing action to the proper Headquarters code, coordinating
and monitoring response action, and documenting and providing
official responses.
3. Scope . The IWSG will have the broadest scope possible
within Headquarters; to acquire data, policy and plans as
needed to support the group effort. SUP 032N will maintain
copies of plans, progress and schedules; monitor funding;
sponsor Headquarters expenditures; coordinate and assure com-
pliance/response to project officer tasking; and, report any
problems/delays
.
4. Authority . The authority of SUP 032N is obtained from the
Deputy Commander, Fleet Support and Supply Operations as
directed through established channels. Workload assignments/
conflicts will be negotiated by SUP 032N and the affected
group members designated to represent NAVSUP Deputy Commanders.
Conflicts will be raised to succeeding command channel levels.
5. Organizational Relationships . SUP 032N functions as a
permanent staff within the SUP 032 division. The matrix staff
performs its normally assigned function within its own organi-
zational entity until called upon by SUP 032N. Once tasked,
members of the matrix staff will be responsible directly to
SUP 032N for completion of tasking. Every effort will be made
to preclude disruption of ongoing work by establishment of
reasonable time frames for response. Deputy Commanders will
make every effort to provide personnel support to meet tasking
assignments. Such tasking will be afforded priority within
organizational codes except for the exceptions authorized by
SUP 09/00.
6. Staffing . The Integrated Warehousing Systems Group (IWSG)







Group Leader SUP 032N
Computer Systems Analyst SUP 032N1
Program Analyst SUP 032N2
Secretary SUP 032NS
b. Matrix Staff
Storage Specialist SUP 0321
Material Equipment § Systems
Specialist SUP 0322
Physical Distribution Specialist FMSO 953
Program/Budget Analyst SUP 012
Facilities Engineer SUP 0324
Supply Systems Analyst SUP 0421
Supply Systems Analyst SUP 0414
Transportation Specialist SUP 052
Computer Systems Specialist FMSO 94
Systems Accountant SUP 044
Storage Specialist Each NSC
7. Project Transition and Disestablishment . It is anticipated
that the SUP 032N organization will be retained during the life
of the project and up to one year after implementation at the
last NSC. Most of the matrix organization will be retained up
to that point in time. Six months after implementation at the








This plan describes the organization which will be
structured to conduct the source selection process. The
responsibilities, functions, duties and basic structural
relationships are defined herein. The designation of the
membership of the SSEB and Category Leaders will be
accomplished separately.
2 . DESIGNATION OF SOURCE SELECTION PERSONNEL .
2.1 SOURCE SELECTION AUTHORITY (SSA) .
Rear Admiral V.T. EDSALL, SC, USN
2.2 PROCURING CONTRACTING OFFICER (PCO) .
Commander David M. CHISM, SC, USN (Regional Contracting
Department, NSC Oakland)
2.3 SOURCE SELECTION ADVISORY COUNCIL (SSAC) . The
chairman and members of the SSAC have been designated by
the Source Selection Authority and are as follows:
Chai rman:





Captain M.W. VAN VALKENBURG, SC, USN
Captain B. AVI LES-ALFARO, JR, SC, USN
Captain R.O. HURT, SC, USN




2.4 SOURCE SELECTION EVALUATION BOARD (SSEB) .
a. The Chairman SSAC has designated Captain O.R.
HINKLE, SC, USN as the Chairman of the Source
Selection Evaluation Board.
b. Members of the SSEB will be designated by the
Chairman, SSAC.
c. Each SSEB member will be a Category Leader as
assigned by the Chairman SSEB with the approval
of the Chairman SSAC.
3.0 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES .
3.
1
DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SOURCE SELECTION
AUTHORITY (SSA) .
a. Ensure that the entire source selection process,
encompassing proposal solicitation, evaluation,
selection and contract award, is properly and
efficiently conducted.
b. Ensure that equitable and effective actions are
taken, consistent with the Defense Acquisition
Regulation (DAR) , to attain a manageable but
competitive number of final proposals for the
selection process.
c. Appoint the chairman and membership of the Source
Selection Advisory Council (SSAC).
d. Ensure that an evaluation group structure, with a
minimum number of members compatible with the





e. Approve the Source Select i on Plan (SSP) and ensure
that the proposed program approach is compatible
with the requirements of the Navy Integrated
Storage Tracking and Retrieval System (NI STARS)
r equi rement s
.
f. Ensure that cost is appropriately considered
as an integral element of proposal evaluation,
together with technical approach and management
capability, in accordance with the relative order
of importance of the evaluation factors and selection
cr i ter ia
.
g. Provide SSAC and/or Source Selection Evaluation
Board (SSEB) with appropriate guidance and special
instructions as may be necessary for the conduct
of the evaluation and selection process.
h. Approve weighting factors and competitive range
determi nat ions
.
i. Be the sole authority to authorize release of
source selection data and information.
j. Make the decision as to the source after an in-
depth review and consideration of all information
and data available from the SSAC and the Source
Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB).
k. Approve the execution of the contracts, including
contract definition contracts and the operation
and maintenance augmentation contract if awarded




3.2 DUTIES AMD RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PROCURING CONTRACTING
OFFICER (PCO) .
a. Serve as a staff advisor to the Source Selection
Authority (SSA), Source Selection Advisory Council
(SSAC) and Source Selection Evaluation Board
(SSEB)
.
b. Assist in the preparation of the Source Selection
Plan (SSP)
.
c. Assure that the source selection criteria set
forth in the Source Selection Plan (SSP) approved
by the Source Selection Authority (SSA) are properly
addressed in the solicitation document.
d. Assure that all aspects of the contract definition
solicitations are clearly and properly addressed.
e. Assure that proposals are requested on a basis
which permits verification of the cost data.
f. Determine responsibility of offerors within the
meaning of the DAR.
g. Conduct negotiations in accordance with the requirements
of DAR 3-805.
h. Concur in the final decision fo"r award after
an in-depth review and consideration of all information
available from the SSA, SSAC, and SSEB.
i. Prepare the contract award documents and obtain




j. Request and direct necessary audits and Cost
Analyses.
3 .3 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SOURCE SELECTION
ADV I SPRY COUNC I L ( S SAC
)
.
a. Review and approve the Source Selection Plan
prior to its submission to the Source Selection
Authority (SSA) for final approval.
b. Develop the criteria for evaluation and selection
in a relative order oi importance and establish
the numerical weighting system. Weights will be
disclosed only to the PCO.
c. Make competitive range recommendations to SSA.
d. Provide the Source Selection Evaluation Board
(SSEB) with appropriate guidance and special
instructions as may be necessary for the conduct
of the evaluation process.
e. Appoint the chairman and membership of the Source
Selection Evaluation Board (responsibility of
SSAC cha i rman)
.
f. Receive such briefings, confirmations, reports
of p re -award surveys, audits, etc., as may be
necessary throughout the source selection process.
g. Review and consider the source selection evaluation
report prepared by the SSEB. Apply category




h. Prepare a proposal analyses report for submission
to the SSA.
i. Make a source selection recommendation to the
SSA unless otherwise directed by the SSA.
j. Document for the SSA's signature, the justification
for the source selection decision.
3.4 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SOURCE SELECTION
EVALUAT I ON BOARD ( S SEB
)
. *
3.4.1 CHAIRMAN OF THE SSEB . The Chairman of the SSEQ
will:
a. Promptly, upon receipt of offerors' proposals,
convene an Evaluation Board to evaluate those
proposals in accordance with the Source Selection
Plan.
b. Assure that members of the SSEB are qualified
for the tasks assigned and are properly briefed
as to the extent of their duties and responsibilities
c. Obtain a suitable, dedicated space for conduct
of the evaluat ion .
d. Establish administrative procedures, in conjunction
with the Contracting Officer,- to safeguard
the integrity of the selection process.
e. Recommend to the SSA the personnel for appointment
to the Pre-Award Survey (PAS) Team: the offeror(s)
to be surveyed; and the proposed date of the
Survey at least one week prior to commencement




PAS is to validate proposal data submitted by
offerors and to evaluate technical capability and
responsibility.
f. Submit clarification/ deficiency questions to Con-
tracting Officer.
g. Submit evaluation reports to SSAC.
h. Provide such briefings and consultations concerning
their evaluation as may be required by the Source
Selection Authority (SSA) or Source Selection Advisory
Council CSSAC).
i. Promptly advise the SSA of any significant delays in
the evaluation process.
3.4.2 SOURCE SELECTION EVALUATION BOARD (SSEB)
The SSEB will:
a. Review and consolidate questions from category leaders
concerning technical, and management clarification in
offerors' proposals.
b. Perform proposal scoring.
c. Ensure timely inputs from Evaluation Team members.
d. Prepare a source selection evaluation report which
clearly and concisely describes the findings of the
proposal evaluation, including the strengths, weak-
nesses and risks associated with each competitor's
proposal.
e. Perform the function of the category leaders and




3.4.3 SOURCE SELECTION EVALUATION BOARD (SSEB) CATEGORY
LEADERS . The category leaders will:
a. Review category evaluation sheets, narratives
and remarks for completeness and accuracy.
b. Establish category raw scores.
c. Prepare category raw score and narrative reports




assigned to their category.
e. Brief the SSEB Chairman as required.
3.4.4 CATEGORY EVALUATORS . Individual evaluators will:
a. Evaluate the proposals as submitted by potential
contractors against the requirements established
in the Request for Proposals and the proposal
evaluation/selection criteria approved by the
SSA.








5.1.1 GENERAL . Administrative support and services
for the NISTARS Program will be provided by the Naval
Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) . These include military
and civilian personnel administration, space allocations,
office services, office equipment, financial accounting
services, security, graphic arts, and communications.
5.1.2 PHYSICAL RESOURCES . The NISTARS Project Office
will provide a secure central work and storage area for
the evaluation process. Details of the space arrangement
will be made available to the Source Selection Organization
when the information becomes available.
5.1.3 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE . The NISTARS Project Office
will also arrange for all administrative functions relating
to proposal evaluation. These responsibilities include
Security.
5.1.4 WORKING HOURS . Normal work ing hours of Evaluation
Team members will be 0730 to 1600 Monday through Friday.
5.1.5 LEAVE . Rigid schedules have been established
in order to accomplish complete and timely Source Selections.
Accordingly, the use of leave other than for emergencies
by all personnel participating in the Source Selection
will be strongly discouraged during the- evaluat ion process.
Sickness and other reasons for absence of personnel
assigned to the Source Selection evaluation will be reported
by the individual to the Chairman, SSEB not later than




and estimated duration. Timely notification is mandatory
in order to inform the category leader and the purposes of
record and timekeeping.
5.1.6 INCOMING TELEPHONE CALLS . Evaluation team members
will not be called to the telephone except in emergency.
Incoming calls will be received by the clerical staff and
a message will be given to the individual involved to return
the call at his convenience.
5.2 SECURITY REGULATIONS
5.2.1 GENERAL . The source selection process demands absolute
security throughout the entire proceedings, including the
actions of all personnel associated with the evaluation of
proposals, deliberations of the various boards, and presen-
tations to higher authority. Inadvertent disclosures can
be very damaging to the Navy, both in terms of criticism
resulting from failure to conduct business affairs properly,
and the loss of the competitive environment.
Each individual shall be familiar with the security
precautions contained within this plan as well as those
precautions set forth below. Handling of all source selec-
tion documentation shall be in strict accordance with the
following:
Defense Acquisition Regulations (PAR)
,
paragraphs 1-113, 1-329, 1-1006, 3-507, and
3-805.3.
° SECNAV Instruction 5371.3.




5.2.2 PHYSICAL RESOURCES . The Source Selection evaluators
will accomplish their assigned tasks in a secure central
work area with controlled access. The Proposal Stowage area
will be protected and posted with appropriate signs. If the
room(s) or building is so situated as to require armed guards
for access control, this force will be administered by the
Security Officer.
Provisions will be made for the stowage of material
during the evaluation. The contractors' proposals are priv-
ileged and adequate security safeguards will be maintained.
Daily security checks will be made to insure that security
requirements and instructions are being followed.
All working papers, rough drafts, computation sheets,
carbon copies and stenographic notes relating to documents
which are not required for retention in the official Source
Selection files will be placed in burn bags for immediate
destruction. The material will be handled for destruction
on the same basis as that prescribed for classified waste
under existing instructions. Burn bags will be stored in
proper security containers at the end of each working day.
The Security Officer will make arrangements for daily pick-up
of burn bags.
No documents will be removed from the evaluation areas
for any purposes without specific authorization from the Chair-
man of the SSEB. At the conclusion of the Source Selection
Evaluation, members of the Evaluation Team will not be per-
mitted to retain any work papers, or any part of the proposals
received.
5.2.3 UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE . If at any time during the
evaluation process it should be found that there has been




business information or privileged information, the matter
will be brought to the attention of the Chairman of the SSEB,
and a full investigation shall be conducted by appropriate
Security authorities. The results of this investigation
will be made known to the Chairman of the SSEB as soon as
possible for appropriate corrective measures.
5.2.4 SECURITY OFFICER . In carrying out his responsibility
the Security Officer will:
a. Formulate security procedures to be observed at the
evaluation sites during and after working hours,
and during emergencies.
b. Implement physical security programs for the handling,
stowage, and protection of all material received at
the evaluation sites.
c. Coordinate procedures for the handling of visitors.
d. Assure that all persons who are to handle classified,
unclassified and privileged material are appropriately
cleared.
e. Formulate and coordinate a security orientation
program for the security procedures to be followed
including the protection and handling of classified
and privileged material.
f. Formulate and coordinate procedures for the destruc-
tion of classified and privileged material. The





g. Report all actual or potential security violations
at the evaluation sites to the Chairman of
the SSEB.
h. Formulate and coordinate duties and responsibilities
of the clerical personnel assigned watches
as Receptionist.
i. Formulate and coordinate procedures for the
manufacture and issuing of special identification
badges for authorized Evaluation and Source
Selection members (if required).
j. Provide arrangements for the pick-up of burn
bags at the evaluation site.
5.2.5 PUBLICATIONS CUSTODIAN . In order that all classified,
unclass i
f
ied .and privileged material received at the
evaluation sites will be under direct control and accounta-
bility during the evaluation phase, a Publications Custodian
and alternates will be designated as assistants to the
Security Officer. Their responsibilities will be to:
a. Maintain a positive record of accountability
of all proposal documents including sign in/sign
out records.
b. Establish identification of each person requesting
proposal documents and assure that each person
is authorized access to the documents.
c. Do not permit access to the secure library
area unless authorized by Chairman, SSEB.
d. Maintain positive control of evaluation




e. Maintain custody of burn bags until collected
for burning.
5.2.6 RECEPTIONIST . Recept i on i s t 'S ta t i on ( s ) will be
established at the evaluation site(s) to control access
of personnel. Assignment of individuals to Receptionist
Station(s) will be scheduled by the Security Officer.
The general duties and responsibilities of the Receptionist
are to:
a. Establish identification of each person entering
and leaving the evaluation areas and permit
access only to authorized personnel.
b. Control identification badges, including the
issuance of the badge at the beginning of
the working day and the accountability of
all badges at the end of the normal working
hours (if required).
c. Report any and all violations of procedures
or any circumstances which may arise that
are not covered by existing instructions to
to Security Officer.
5
. 3 RULES OF CONDUCT .
The following rules of conduct will be scrupulously
followed by all participants in the source selection.
Refer all att emp ted c ommu nications by contractors'
repesentat ives to the Procuring Contracting Officers.
Do not discuss any aspect of the source selection




Discussions with panel members concerning proposals shall
be conducted only within the specific evaluation areas of
concern. One should never assume that it is safe to speak
of the source selection because one is among Government
employees or is in Government buildings. The obligation
not to discuss any aspect of the source selection does not
end with the completion of the source selection activities.
While all or part of the technical proposal content may be
available for use within the Government at some later time,
the source selection evaluation information remains privileged
except as specifically approved for release by the SSEB.
Once the panels have been convened, contact with the
contractors for additional information or clarification of
the proposal shall be made only through the Contracting
Officer or his designated representative.
No rules or regulations can cover all possible situations.
Therefore, the evaluators shall use discretion, good judgment,
and personal integrity in all undefined situations.
All members of the SSAC and SSEB will be required to
execute a Certificate of Non-Disclosure (Appendix A) and
Statement of Financial Interest (Appendix B) indicating that
there is no known conflict of interests. The Certificates
and Statements will be submitted to the SSA for evaluation
in accordance with NAVMAT Instruction 5370.13 of June 1976
as follows:
(a) The SSAC members and the chairman of the SSEB
shall forward to the SSA not later than 30 days after the
first meeting of the SSAC.
(b) The SSEB members shall forward to the SSA not




7.0 EVALUAT I ON PROCEDURES .
7.1 Evaluation is accomplished by reviewing and analyzing
each offeror's proposal, to determine what is offered, then
comparing the offer to the evaluation critera. The
evaluator must remember that he need not accept, without
question, data presented in the proposal. He is expected
to use his expert knowledge and experience to determine
the feasibility, logic, and the reasonableness of the
offeror's response. In some instances, he may want to
verify certain aspects of the data that are outside his
technical skill field. He may <3o this by discussion with
advisors, consultants, or other SSEB members.
7.2 In order that an acceptable evaluation may be conducted,
the evaluator must know: what he is to evaluate; what
the sol ic i tat ion/s tatement of work requires; and what
is considered the minimum acceptable response. These data
should be available in the factor descriptions and
evaluation criteria which are provided to each evaluator.
The evaluator should become familiar with that portion
of the description and standards which pertain to his
task. In addition, he should familiarize himself with
the description and evaluation criteria of other related
and/or interfacing factors and subfactors.
7.3 How an evaluator approaches the task of evaluation
is up to his own judgment based on his experience. The
method by which it is accomplished is dependent on what
he feels best suits the particular circumstances. The
only constraints placed upon him are those imposed by
the overall evaluation schedule and the inputs he must
furnish other evaluators. It is, however, important that
all evaluators be consistent in their approach to evaluation.
Failure to do so will result in distortion of the true




7.4 The preparation of the evaluation analysis in narrative
form is the most important aspect of the evaluation process.
a. In preparing the narrative which communicates the •
evaluator's findings to the SSAC, he must under-
stand that his narrative will prove the most useful,
and usually the only means available to the SSAC to
inform the SSA what a company offered and how well
it met the established standards.
b. It is not sufficient that the narrative states that
something is good or inferior. The evaluator must
indicate in the narrative what was offered; how it
met the evaluation criteria, or how it failed to
meet the minimum requirements; what, in the evalu-
ator's opinion, must be done to remedy the deficiency;
and what impact (including technical and cost risk)
the deficiency correction will have on the overall
acceptability of the offeror's proposal.





NAVAL INTEGRATED STORAGE, TRACKING
AND RETRIEVAL SYSTEM
SOURCE SELECTION EVALUATION BOARD
CERTIFICATE OF NON-DISCLOSURE
I have read, fully understand and will comply with
the Rules of Conduct and Security Regulations contained
in Section VIII of the Source Selection Plan for the
NI STARS Project.
I understand my obligation not to divulge information
received in confidence from contractors in connection
with bids and proposals, trade secrets, inventions,
discoveries, and reports of a financial, technical and
scientific nature.
I further understand my responsibility not to disclose
the methods or procedures being used by the SSAC or SSEB
to evaluate contractors' proposals. I hereby affirm
that I will not reveal, disclose, or release the standards,
ratings or scores used by or any information concerning,
the Source Selection evaluation process unless authorized
to do so by the SSA.
Member's Signature





6.1 SYSTEM MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
The proposals will be evaluated for their staffing
requirements with maximum credit given for least manning
requirements and lesser credit given for higher proposed
staffing. The specifications contain labor standards that
shall be adhered to when calculating the manning levels for
the specified functions. The system manpower requirements
consist of operational and support personnel. The opera-
tional personnel are identified as warehouse functional
types, i.e., receipt processing warehousemen, storage device
operators, remote terminal operators, packers, etc. and
process controller operators. The support personnel are
identified as supervisors and maintenance staff (software
and hardware, i.e., process controller, terminals, process
controller peripherals, materials handling equipment, etc.).
Assumptions: The system is assumed to operate one shift
per day with the process controller staffed for three shifts
to respond to high priority requirements. All preventative
maintenance is to be performed during other than prime shift
operations
.
6.2 SYSTEM THROUGHPUT REQUIREMENTS
The proposals will be evaluated for their capability to
meet the specified throughput requirements.
The system throughput requirements are defined in two
distinct levels. The lowest or base level throughput require-
ment is based upon the current workload and must be attainable
with the process controller; peripherals, and material hand-
ling equipment that is installed. The upgraded throughput




Attainable without any change in the process controller
software; however, the process controller, peripherals, and
materials handling equipment may be augmented. Assumption:









6. 2 SYSTEM CONTROL
The proposals will be evaluated for their capability
to provide the specified systems control requirements or
on the degree to which these requirements are met. Those
systems control requirements that are under the latter
evaluation method are material tracking, storage cube
utilization, operating personnel/process controller inter-
faces, production control to effectively manage the system's
resources (m^erial handling equipment and operating per-
sonnel) and to level the workload to provide the required
throughput, on-line training program, and types of manage-
ment reports to provide supervisory personnel with useful










The process controller subsystem will be evaluated to
determine if the hardware architecture and software design
meet the specified requirement to provide a continuous,
fully operational system unaffected by the failure of a
single (remainder missing from original Source Selection Plan)
either meeting or failing to meet this requirement. Like-
wise, the intelligent remote terminals and the material
handling devices will be evaluated to determine if they meet
the 95% reliability as specified. The process controller
and associated intelligent remote terminals, controllers and
communications media will be evaluated to determine if the
proposed configuration can meet the maximum response time
as specified.
6.5 SYSTEM MAINTENANCE
The proposals will be evaluated for their maintenance
concepts and plans and their conformance to the specified
requirements. The system shall be evaluated for the ease
of maintenance, by using modular ly designed components,
and providing maximum interchangeability of components.
The system maintenance capability will be evaluated for its
availability of spare parts. This evaluation will provide
maximum credit for the use of all standard, currently oper-
ational, equipment and will be decremented for the use of
non-standard equipment for which historical spare parts
information do not exist. The evaluation will also con-
sider designated preventative maintenance intervals,
specialized test equipment, and proposed spare parts inven-
tory with maximum credit given for least amounts in these





The proposals will be evaluated to determine a pro-
spective contractor's previous experience, present staff
capabilities, and project management methodology for ful-
filling the Navy's installation and operational requirements
Each prospective contractor's previous experience will be
evaluated for competency in the design and implementation
in the following categories: (a) integrated materials
handling systems, (b) integrated systems and (c) materials
handling systems. Each prospective contractor's present
staff capability will be evaluated by reviewing the resumes
of key individuals earmarked to participate in the project.
As a minimum this review will include managers and senior
project leaders for all functional departments involved in
the NISTARS project. Each prospective contractor's project
management methodology shall be evaluated for adequacy in
providing continuous and effective reporting of project
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